

# AUAS

"The fight against the personal  
idea is a long one."

—ROBERT CROSBIE

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### CAN WAR BE ABOLISHED?

In order to answer the question, "Can war be abolished?"—we must first enquire if war be a disease in itself, or merely an outward symptom of an inward and hidden malady. If his patient have a high temperature, a doctor does not try to cool him by applying ice or dosing him with febrifuges, but seeks to diagnose some underlying trouble; and when he has found it, prescribes accordingly. In like manner, to abolish war, we must first look for, and then remove, the causes of which it is the symptom and the effect.

Were war an isolated or accidental phenomenon, it would be quite easy to do away with it. The smallest exercise of common-sense by persons of average intelligence—and most statesmen must be so classified—would prompt them to do or suffer almost anything in order to avoid it; for the experience of 1914–1918 proves

that, under modern conditions, war is disastrous to all who engage in it: victors and vanquished being involved in a common ruin.

But going to war is not an action decided on by reasonable men after careful consideration of pros and cons, as one might decide to remove from one house to another. It is rather to be compared to an act of violence committed on a rising tide of hysteria by a man who has lost control of himself. Those who recall what happened in 1914, will remember the wave of intense emotion that passed over half the world, and swept away all vestige of collective reasoning power and discrimination. The vast majority in all the nations involved were so dominated by a tempest of jealousy, fear, and the hatred that always goes with fear, together with an intermingling of more generous emotions, as to be quite incapable of rational



thought or action. Men were as little masters of themselves and their destiny as though they had all been drugged or hypnotised. Quiet, kindly disposed, people became as bloodthirsty as Apache Indians on the war-path; and normally intelligent folk developed a blind credulity and were eager to believe any sensational rumour, however absurd. In such a state of mass hysteria, the actual declaration of war was only an incident, inevitable in the circumstances, just as the violent actions of a man suffering from delirium are the necessary consequence of his bodily condition. The murder of Franz Ferdinand and the political intrigues, which preceded and followed it, could never have set the world aflame unless the world had been in a very inflammable psychological condition. Throw a lighted match on the ground and it will burn itself out harmlessly; but if it happen to fall on a heap of gunpowder, there will be an explosion. Serbia was such a lighted match.

War-fever is something like malaria, inasmuch as its virus remains passive in the patient's blood for a time, and then becomes mischievously active, afterwards relapsing into passivity, during which it appears to be renewing its energies in preparation for another outbreak. To carry the simile a step further, we may say that violent attacks of both malaria and war-fever do not occur to people whose systems are not already infected with the microbes of those diseases.

The life history of the malaria microbe is well known, thanks to the researches of the late Sir Ronald Ross; but the nature of the bacteria of war is less widely recognised. Functioning, as it does, on the plane of psychology and not on that of biology, it cannot be isolated in the laboratory, nor detected by the most powerful of microscopes. It is engendered by the union of egotism with lack of self-control. Every individual who pursues his own personal ends, regardless of the rights and happiness of others; every employer who seeks to extract from his business the last penny of profit by underpaying or overworking his men; every workman who tries to get the highest pay for the least possible work, even to the point of ruining the industry in which he is engaged—may be said to be infected with it. Its poison works in nations as well as in individuals; and every government that ruthlessly carries out the kind of policy that an Italian statesman in a moment of patriotic delirium called *sacro egoismo*, is its prey. Such individuals and such nations are ripe for war; and, despite all the resolutions of all the peace conferences, will be carried away by what is literally war-fever when the critical moment comes.

In psychological conditions like those of 1914, war would again become inevitable. The emotional temperature of the world would again rise to fever heat; and in our excitement, hatred would again be envisaged as a

virtue, and wounded self-esteem as zeal for the honour of the fatherland. The great majority of us would forget all the overwhelming arguments against war, and be apt to plunge blindly into what in our saner moments we recognise as an act of collective suicide. Of course we should rationalise our hysteria, and find excellent reasons for regarding the particular war then in the making as different from all previous wars. We might even persuade ourselves, as many excellent people did in 1914, that our war was in the nature of a holy crusade against war in general.

If we have correctly diagnosed war as the expression in violent action of the periodical crises of a disease of the psyche, of which the root causes are egotism and lack of self-control, it will follow that peace conferences, pacts of non-aggression, League of Nations, and the like, while excellent in their way, do not really touch the root of the matter at all. The

only real and effective antidotes to war are unselfishness and self-control; and every advocate of peace must begin by establishing these conditions *in himself*. By so doing he will become immune against those outbursts of collective hysteria which constitute war-fever, and will be able to exercise cool, impersonal, dispassionate judgment in a crisis. The influence of but a few such individuals on their neighbours, and even on governments, would be quite out of proportion to their numbers.

The abolition of war, then, would appear to depend primarily on an ethical and spiritual movement inspiring individuals to build up the basic conditions of peace in themselves: through them the nations will be influenced. The political propaganda of peace is useful only if it proceed *pari passu* with such an ethical and spiritual movement; but, without it, must be quite ineffective.

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*What can a man do more than die for his countrymen ?  
Live for them. It is a longer work, and therefore a more  
difficult and a nobler one.*

—CHARLES KINGSLEY



## WHITTIER AND THE BRAHMO SAMAJ

[Arthur Christy was born in China. He has travelled extensively in the Far East and has spent many years in the study of comparative religions. His most recent work, entitled *The Orient in American Transcendentalism*, published by the Columbia University Press, is the first attempt to examine extensively the beginnings of the intellectual and religious contacts of the Orient and the U. S. A. At present he is investigating the extent of the oriental influence on American men of letters. The following article presents some interesting facts which have been heretofore completely ignored by American scholars. In this centenary year of the death of Ram Mohun Roy, the founder of the Brahmo Samaj, this article is of special interest.—EDS.]

Whittier is nearly the last of the nineteenth century American poets in whom one would expect to find appreciable evidences of an Oriental influence. He was a Quaker, for the greater part of his life actively engaged in a journalistic war against the slave-trade, a resident of New England villages, and never known as a man of wide reading. Yet in much of his religious poetry there appear quotations from and allusions to the *Bhagavadgita* and the Vedanta in general. These evidences of an Oriental influence will gradually be recognized. Interpreters of American literature realize the necessity of considering the sociological, philosophical, economic, and religious soil which nurtured the civilization of the new world and its literary culture. In this broader view one sees clearly that Oriental seed had been sown and that it often flowered in the most unexpected place and manner.

There can be little doubt that among the influential agents in the work of introducing Orientalism to America were the early apostles of the Brahmo Samaj,

some of whom visited the new nation. During their visits they lectured widely and their audiences enthusiastically endorsed their message.

In Whittier's prose work may be found two unique references to the Brahmo Samaj. At the conclusion of the essay entitled "Haverford College" appears a letter addressed to Dr. Thomas Chase in which Whittier wrote:—

That Haverford may fully realize and improve its great opportunities as an approved seat of learning and exponent of Christian philosophy which can never be superseded, and which needs no change to fit it for universal acceptance, and which, overpassing the narrow limits of sect, is giving new life and hope to Christendom, and finding its witness in the Hindu revivals of the Brahmo Samaj and the fervent utterances of Chunda Sen and Mozoomdar, is the earnest desire of thy friend.

Even more enthusiastically did Whittier write to James T. Fields, the Boston publisher:—

I hope thee will see the wonderful prophet of the Brahmo Samaj, Mozoomdar, before he leaves the country. I should have seen him in Boston but for illness last week. That movement in India is the greatest in the history of Christianity since the days of Paul.

In the light of such cordial

approval of the Brahmo Samaj, it would be profitable to compare minutely the similarities between Whittier's broad Quaker beliefs and the eclectic doctrines upon which the Indian movement was founded. But preliminary to such a study should be a general survey of the manner Whittier himself used Oriental themes in his poetry and the reasons for their use.

We may safely assume that the poet saw little difference between his own Quaker concept of God as an inner light, or the Eternal Goodness, to use his own phrase, and the cosmic Brahman of the Vedanta. Whittier was not a theologian, although his work was deeply tinged with Christian doctrine. He had great, humane sympathies; his labours in behalf of the negro are a sufficient proof. And since he drew no divisive lines for race, there is no reason to suspect that he excluded, on creedal bases, the convictions of sincere searchers after truth who happened to bear the label of other ethnic faiths.

A clear illustration of this catholic sympathy will be found in the poem "Miriam". In this poem appears a long dialogue between Whittier and a friend on their unsolved doubts, the books they called the "bibles of the ancient folk," and the old moralities. The conversation takes place on a Sabbath after the friends had left the Quaker meeting house. To the question of God's responsibility for the races of mankind, and the nature of truth, Whittier answers:—

Truth is one  
And, in all lands beneath the sun,  
Whoso hath eyes to see may see,  
The tokens of its unity.

In support of this view, he insists that in "Vedic verse" and "the dull Koran," in the thoughts of "our Aryan sires" and "the slant-eyed sages of Cathay" is evidence that the Oriental "read not the riddle all amiss". As if in defence of his latitudinarianism, Whittier continues:—

Nor doth it lessen what he taught,  
Or make the gospel Jesus brought  
Less precious, that his lips retold  
Some portion of that truth of old.

We come home laden from our quest  
To find that all the sages said  
Is in the book our mothers read.

This wholesale finding of the teachings of the Oriental sages in the Bible, and the inclusion of the Brahman, Mohammedan and Confucian, if only by implication, in the "all-embracing Fatherhood" of God, indicates an eclecticism that is much akin to that of the Brahmo Samaj. Furthermore, there are other lines in "Miriam," such as:

Each in its measure but a part  
Of the un-measured Over-heart,

which richly connote Whittier's sympathy with the Vedantic principle of an all-enfolding divinity. It is obvious, even in the light of the lines scantily quoted here, that his beliefs were far removed from the Hebraic concept of a universe composed of three distinct and separate entities—God, man, and matter.

Whittier's explanation of his eclecticism is clear. He welcomed, he said, from every source the tokens of the Primal Force,



Beneath whose steady impulse rolls  
The tidal wave of human souls;  
Guide comforter and inward word,  
The eternal spirit of the Lord!

Well, such lines are too pantheistic to be Christian, and too Christian to be good pantheism. Furthermore, the last line—"Eternal outflow and recall"—indicates anything but the Hebraic-Christian conception of the creative processes of the universe. In the controversy between the proponents of monism and dualism, Whittier seems to have allied himself with the former. God, for him, was immanent in the world, constantly emanating into new forms. This was a basic tenet with the thinkers of both the Vedanta and the Brahmo Samaj. There can be little doubt that Whittier's Quaker belief in the light that lighteth every man had expanded into a philosophy of unique affinities with that of so reputable a sage of the Hindus as Sankara. Without this basic affinity, Whittier might never have been attracted to the Brahmo Samaj. But he was cordial to the Hindu elements of the movement, and when he found that men like Mozoomdar were men of deep personal piety who had woven into the Samaj all the best kindly and personal elements of Christianity, he became an enthusiastic friend and supporter.

In conclusion, there is no more final evidence of Whittier's great interest in the movement than the three "Hymns of the Brahmo Samaj" which are included in his collected works. To these hymns Whittier added the following:—

I have attempted this paraphrase of the Hymns of the Brahmo Samaj of India, as I find them in Mozoomdar's account of the devotional exercises of that remarkable religious development which has attracted far less attention from the Christian world than it deserves, as a fresh revelation of the direct action of the Divine Spirit upon the human heart.

I quote the second of the three hymns:

We fast and plead, we weep and pray,  
From morning until even;  
We feel to find the holy way,  
We knock at the gate of heaven!  
And when in silent awe we wait,  
And word and sign forbear,  
The hinges of the golden gate  
Move, soundless, to our prayer!  
Who hears the eternal harmonies  
Can heed no outward word;  
Blind to all else is he who sees  
The vision of the Lord!

There is, of course, no way in which to determine the public influence of such an enthusiasm as Whittier's. For at least two generations his audience was the serious, religious-minded public of America. In the light of the facts, who can doubt that the Brahmo Samaj, which grew up as a movement of religious reform in India, was unexpectedly to prepare the soil of America for the missionaries from India who were to follow? And who would have dreamed that a provincial poet, long regarded as an orthodox Quaker, was to be a most important nexus in the chain of reasons and events which have culminated in flourishing Orient-inspired cults in America and the broadcasting of the teachings of Theosophy? Surprising indeed are one's discoveries as he re-reads the old poets with new spectacles.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

## THE GOSPEL OF MASS-PRODUCTION

[Hugh I'A. Fausset is a mystic and philosopher whose detached observations on the chaos of our machine age have a practical value and interest. His thoughts should be kept in mind by the reader in perusing the article which follows this: "Bolshevism between East and West".—EDS.]

Whether we lament or exult over the present collapse of Capitalism, we cannot but admit that it is having a very educational effect, and not the least on the Capitalist himself or on those who still believe that the selfish profit-making motive is not an anachronism, but, if intelligently directed and controlled a necessary and beneficent dynamic. I do not believe so myself, since I cannot understand how a motive which is morally indefensible and which the Capitalist himself would be the first to reject as the dynamic of his own family life, can be socially or economically justifiable. But I recognise that we are only just emerging from a long era of human history in which the struggle for existence and subsistence was a hard and bitter fact, and that the habits of thought and conduct induced by that long struggle cannot be thrown off in a day. Men of outstanding imagination and of fine moral sensitiveness have doubtless always challenged these habits and insisted, even in times when a combative egoism seemed a necessary condition of survival, that a true life must be grounded in selflessness. But hitherto their words have seemed to the majority of men the utterance of unpractical dreamers or at best

applicable to some Utopia of the Future. The significance, however, of our own day lies in the fact that the apparent material obstacles to the saint's or the poet's dream of a co-operative community are at least very greatly reduced. I need not discuss here the situation which has arisen through the application of science to industry, the paradox of poverty in a world of plenty.

What I am concerned with is the reaction of rationalistic businessmen and their like to facts which compel even them to recognise that the economic situation has changed and to modify their appreciation of the competitive impulse. To modify—yes, and even to reorganise—their ideas as they reorganise their business. But whether they are apostles of "technocracy" or disciples of Mr. Ford, they are alike in evading a fundamental approach to the problem. They are ready and even eager to "rationalise" selfishness, but they wish to preserve it, in the guise of "enlightened self-interest," as the corner-stone of the future temple of a prosperous humanity. Consequently I cannot help suspecting that despite their fair words and plausible arguments they will prove to be as ineffectual as the money-changers whom Jesus



drove out of another temple. Curiously enough, too, it is easier to evade facing the conditions which govern a true realisation of a creative life to-day, when the material obstacles to it are no longer so formidable, than it was when for most men they seemed insurmountable. For previously the necessity of self-sacrifice was not doubted. No man could respond to the call, "Come, follow me," or hope to qualify for the new kingdom of harmony which was promised him, without surrendering his old self and its attachment to things. The call was clear and unequivocal. For most men the sacrifice demanded was too great. Circumstances, they would plead, made it impossible. But just because the sacrifice demanded seemed to challenge the whole order of material life and to involve a heroic act of faith, its truth was less likely perhaps to be compromised, at least in men's minds, than in a day when Christianity of a kind can be approved as a good and even necessary business policy.

It is exceedingly tempting to-day to think that because outward conditions have altered, inward conditions have altered too, and that the emphasis which was laid by spiritual teachers in the past upon the necessity of sacrifice is no longer relevant now that science is promising us a superfluity of commodities; that we can, in short, get the best of both worlds and combine the riches of the spirit with an unfet-

tered enjoyment of all the cheap and diverting objects of need or pleasure with which mass-production will soon supply us.

Among those who have been recently preaching this seductive gospel is Mr. Filene, whose book, *Successful Living in this Machine Age*, was published last year. Mr. Filene is a highly successful Boston storekeeper, and like many Americans of his kind he has not been content merely to make money or even to perfect the machinery of his business. He has concerned himself with the ethic of trade in general and he has become convinced that its purpose is "to serve people, not merely to support the business-man concerned in it". So far so good. But being a hard-headed business-man this ideal of service had to be reconciled with private profits. He wished to be a benefactor to his kind, but he wished also to be well paid as heretofore for his service. And in the gospel of mass-production he has discovered a way of satisfying both his conscience and his acquisitive instinct, of building up his own profit upon the universal profit of mankind. And it is consequently with an almost ecstatic delight that he demonstrates that the two are no longer incompatible. In his own words:—

Mass Production is not simply large-scale production. It is large-scale production based upon a clear understanding that increased production demands increased buying, and that the greatest total profits can be obtained only if the masses can and do enjoy a higher and ever higher standard of living.

Since, in short, successful mass-

production necessitates both mass-consumption and mass-leisure or in other words high wages and short hours, it will, he argues, change the whole social order, dissolve all class-distinctions and class-privileges, liberate mankind from the struggle for mere existence to which all but a small minority have been bound in the past, and, far from standardising human life, guarantee for all, as never before, the possibilities of distinctive self-expression.

Mr. Filene proclaims his faith with such uncritical enthusiasm, despite his claim to be an apostle of "fact-finding," that he exposes himself damagingly to assault not only from humanists but from economic realists. For even if theoretically successful mass-production necessitates an ever increasing mass-consumption and so should break down the old barriers of nation, class and privilege, it can paradoxically only do so when these barriers have been broken down and a world-community has been realised and organised. Until that has happened an employer whose markets are not in his own country cannot, by paying high wages, increase the buying power of his foreign customers, but may well lose his markets through being undersold by a foreign employer who can produce a similar article at a lower price by paying lower wages. Mass-production, in fact, if it is to do all that Mr. Filene claims for it, depends on real and enlightened co-operation between the whole of mankind, a condition which to-day seems

remote enough. And his fundamental error is in assuming that all the barriers which self-interest has raised between men and nations will be broken down by a more informed self-interest. It is doubtless true that we are experiencing to-day the first stages of what he calls "The Second Industrial Revolution," and that the conditions of machine-production are compelling some business-men at least to realise that greed, competition, cheating and exploitation no longer pay. Yet the motive even of these, as Mr. Filene complacently insists, is a selfish one. It only differs from that of their predecessors for whom trade was uncompromising warfare, in being "enlightened selfishness". And personally I cannot believe in the reality of such a virtue. I cannot believe that "human selfishness" will ever "function unselfishly for the common good on a world-wide scale," or conceive a future community of "intelligently selfish human beings selfishly concerned in bettering the condition of all humanity".

There is of course a sense in which disinterestedness is in the highest interests of the self and is even perceived to be such by those who are disinterested. The truly disinterested man, however, is not "intelligently selfish," but imaginatively selfless. He has undergone a profound inward change by which the old self has been cast off and a new self, that is creative both in its thought and its action, has come into



being. And no "Industrial Revolution" will succeed or transform the world into a creative and co-operative community which does not express this inner revolution and the appreciation of true values which such a revolution inevitably brings.

That selfishness, however discreetly modified by the pressure of facts, can never be really "enlightened" is revealed very clearly in the chapters which Mr. Filene devotes to such subjects as education, religion, art, mechanization, or personal adjustment, and in which he constantly betrays a crude insensitiveness to the finer human values, and this despite the fact that he is quite clearly a generous, warm-hearted and liberal-minded man, who is sincerely anxious to liberate his fellow-men from the poverty and toil which cramp their lives. But while we may agree with him that the world of the future will have as little use for selfishly superior persons as for timidly acquisitive business-men, and applaud his desire to free mankind from the struggle for mere existence, his disregard of any but the material facts and needs of human nature is constantly apparent. Certainly he professes himself to be a champion of all that will make men more truly human, but "enlightened selfishness" blinds him to the fact that "the way of human liberation" involves something more than material security and mental development.

Only the truly selfless man can know what are the essential

human needs and values, because he will himself have outgrown all false and delusive needs. But such qualitative values are swamped in the liberated life Mr. Filene visualises, in the quantity of standardised things, which, as a good merchant, he is anxious to sell for his own profit and that of others. In the world saved by mass-production, which he conceives and champions, the inward being of man promises to be overwhelmed and stupefied by external excitements and satisfactions. Nor does he really face the fact that the constantly increasing capacity of mass-production, even if accompanied by a like capacity of mass-consumption, must ultimately reach a saturation point in those comforts and luxuries which move him to such lyrical ecstasy.

He does, indeed, ask "how shall the masses use the wealth and leisure and security which mass-production will bring to them," and he admits that in the remote future, when all the more superficial appetites have been satisfied, "we may expect that there will be some general liberation from the tyranny of things". But how this return to simplicity will occur and what, if it does, will happen to mass-production, he does not stay to enquire. And it is difficult to see how meanwhile the generations who, as he gleefully anticipates, will be accepting the tyranny of things until their digestion is glutted, will achieve "successful living" in this or any other machine age.

Mr. Filene's mistake and that of those like him is of course a confusion of means with ends. To preach salvation through mass-production or any other form of rationalised trade or economics is to evade the central issue. Mass-production is a mechanism. But above all it needs to be controlled, directed, and utilised by men and women who have outgrown a false attachment to things and who, by so doing, have become really social. And so long as they cling to the possessive instinct, as Mr. Filene does, they have not become completely human and so they are not qualified by imaginative insight to "better the condition of all humanity". They may possibly exploit mass-production successfully, but much of what they produce and distribute will not supply the essential needs of ordinary men and women, but will only create distracting and artificial needs.

Nevertheless such evangelists as Mr. Filene are hopeful por-

tents. The moralists have always taught that unselfishness and co-operation were in reality in the highest interests of the self, but so long as the conditions of buying and selling proved that greed and competition, if ultimately short-sighted, brought considerable immediate returns, the business-man could turn a deaf ear to the moralist's teaching. But science and the machine are in process of changing all that. They are compelling the shrewder business-man, and even politician, to recognise the necessity of co-operation and to work for a unified world-organisation. And ultimately it will be forced upon them that such co-operation can only be realised organically, through the death of "intelligent selfishness," although civilisation, as we know it, may of course have to die a violent death before the intelligently selfish have learnt that a creative life cannot be combined with a possessive.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET



## BOLSHEVISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

[Hans Kohn is the author of *A History of Nationalism in the East and Nationalism in Soviet Union*. He lived many years in Asiatic Russia, has travelled widely, and at present resides in Jerusalem. His article is enthusiastic over the industrialization and westernization of Russia, but we also ought to have another picture drawn—Russia triumphant in machine and mechanics like the U. S. A., but with armies of unemployed; possessing wealth and the power to make more wealth but also beset with the problems of glut and poverty. Perhaps Russia will benefit from the lessons of the U. S. A., but that would be a subject for a third picture.—EDS.]

Maxim Gorki, the great lover of the Russian people, who himself came out of its lowest depths and was the friend of bare-footed tramps, has described Russian life in a realistic and unsweetened way in his fascinating volume *My Childhood*. He has seen all the contrasts of Russian life, its drabness and ugliness, the terrible poverty and illiteracy of the people after many centuries of serfdom and neglect, and on the other side the lofty longings, the beautiful fight uphill, standing out in keen contrast to the miserable background. In his book which appeared in 1913 he sketches for us an old peasant couple, grandfather and grandmother, who in the contrast of their characters are representative of the Russian peasantry. Grandmother is a big woman, fat and plump, entirely uneducated and often very silly. She has the spaciousness of the Russian earth, Mother Earth, as it is called in Russian, and she seems in a primitive, impersonal way attached to the earth, to nature, like a plant. She is soft and kind, passive and contemplative. Grandfather is entirely different. He is bony and

of a strong frame, scraggy and hard. He is half-educated but he is eager to learn; he is active but he does not know yet to which aim to direct his activity. He opposes a harsh narrowness to Grandmother's exultant boundlessness. He is not yet a personality but he has emerged from dim and semi-conscious vegetativeness and is on his way to become under proper guidance an educated individuality. Meanwhile he misses an outlet for his energies: he beats Grandmother and her meek acquiescence rouses him to beat her more and more.

Gorki has tried to interpret these two aspects of Russian life in his essay "Two Souls". Grandmother is for him the East with its mystic and contemplative spirit, Grandfather the Occident with its scientific and ever active civilization. Russia has been a meeting place of East and West by her history and by her nature. Asiatic and European races have during fifteen centuries mixed their blood in the immense plains of Eurasia. For many centuries the country was ruled by Eastern hordes. The Russian form of Christianity had its origin in

Byzantine tradition and sank into the magnificent apathy of the East; the great creative forces of the West, Rome and medieval philosophy, the Renaissance and Reformation, left Russia untouched. The natural communications led from Moscow not westwards but along the rivers to Kazan and Astrakhan and into the heart of Asiatic steppes. The Russian peasants lived like the masses in Asia in abject poverty and illiteracy, as serfs, and in a perpetual danger of famine; the women of the Russian nobles were secluded in harems, and the merchant of Moscow much more closely resembled the merchant of Asia in clothing and habits of life, in his domestic arrangements and his outlook on the world than the traders of Western Europe.

Peter the Great was the first Tsar to try to open Russia, at that time wholly Asiatic, to western influence. He did it in an oriental way—by ruthless despotism. But his and his successors' reforms remained superficial and reached only a very small upper circle of society. In the nineteenth century a growing number of the newly formed middle-class intelligentsia turned their eyes westwards. Charmed by the refinement and intellectual discipline of western science, they became apostles of westernisation and education in Russia. They tried to raise the standards of Russian social and economic life to the higher levels of Europe and to combat the corruption, inertia and apathy of Russian life. By the

efforts of the intelligentsia. Russia had two souls, as Gorki put it, an Eastern and a Western one. Gorki's sympathy was entirely with the Western soul. Grandfather was perhaps not a pleasant character, he was half-educated and narrow-minded, but at least he knew something, he was active, he was on the way upwards. If there was any hope for an educated progressive Russia attaining European standards it was through Grandfather, not through Grandmother.

Bolshevism has resumed the work of Peter the Great and the westernised intelligentsia of the last century on an incomparably greater scale. They undertook to westernise an eastern country with a new boldness of conception and an unprecedented systematic thoroughness. They had no love and no understanding of the Asiatic past of the country and the people, for mystical contemplation, for the easy-going timelessness. Their attention was turned entirely towards the future, a future of organized activity and scientific efficiency. The efforts of Bolshevism have been directed during the last fifteen years to educating the population of the Soviet Union for a Europeanised and industrialized standard of life, to remoulding entirely all ways of life and thought. Success could be achieved only at a tremendous cost: the old foundations of life had to be radically transformed, ancient traditions to be destroyed, one hundred and fifty million human beings had



to be uprooted out of their native Mother Earth and replanted under entirely different conditions intellectual and moral. But this westernization could be undertaken for the very reason that the people dealt with were Asiatic by their past and by their disposition. Their collectivist energies and their faculty to suffer and to endure made the communistic experiment possible. The fact that the masses in the vast Russian Empire who partly were Eurasians and partly Asians of a pure stock lived still a semi-conscious unindividual or pre-individual life, rendered them easily accessible to the moulding influences of Bolshevism. But their Eastern soul brought into the new faith of Communism the old fervour and the mystical enthusiasm for the absolute, the hatred of compromise, a certain savageness of the extremes. Modern individualism, with its emphasis on the independent value of the individual, had no claim here. Bolshevism has been, like the reforms of Peter the Great, but on a wholly different scale, the Western force shaping this Eastern boundlessness into form, hammering the masses out of their apathy and their defenceless acceptance of fate to creative energy and to will power. As Gorki had predicted: Grandfather has won his fight against Grandmother. Grandfather has grown and he has learned and is still full of eagerness to learn. The new youth in the Soviet Union follows his ways. It is full of confidence

in itself, active and hard, imbued with the joy of a pioneering generation. The great world significance of Bolshevism lies in this attempt of an all-embracing westernisation of Asiatic or semi-Asiatic masses, who are summoned from the apathy of the times when men took no thought for ordering society and dominating nature according to their wants, to play their part in history for the first time, adapting to their purpose western methods of production and organization, and guided by a faith born of western philosophy and western rationalism and bearing the stamp of the triumphal march of the machine-age.

In this attempt to westernise eastern lands Bolshevism is not alone. We witness to-day the re-awakening of the whole East under the irresistible compact of western civilisation. New means of communication and the penetration of the machine into the remotest parts of the once secluded East have opened it everywhere to the influences of the West. New methods of education are being introduced into the East, replacing the old traditions which were rightly considered out of date. A very difficult and complex problem not of simple imitation but of creative adaptation is put before eastern nations. But, as a prominent American educationalist with a good knowledge of the East has remarked, if the East is to survive in the twentieth century it must of necessity modify its institutions and its

traditions in such a manner as will enable it to meet the demands which a fluidic and dynamic civilization founded upon scientific concepts and technical equipment places upon all nations to-day. The same view was expressed authoritatively by the League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts to China:—

In view of the imperative and urgent necessity of modernising social and economic conditions in China, the main object of the education of the masses should be to point out the road leading to modernisation. It would not, therefore, be advisable, as is at present the practice, to explain everything in terms of the past, but rather to give prominence, as the (Bolshevist) Russians do when giving object lessons, to the needs of the future. In China the future is too often neglected, both in the education of the young and in adult education. This is perhaps due to the highly developed historical sense of the Chinese, but if China is to be rapidly modernised, men must look forward rather than back.

The Soviet Union attempts this modernisation by looking forward in a radical and sweeping manner, paying no regard to the past. Bolshevism is performing the modernising of social and economic conditions; the transformation of education and life which has gone on during these years in the entire East, with a ruthless vigour and uncouth disregard for tradition, finds its parallel in Kemalist Turkey. Russia had been like China, India or the Ottoman Empire, a poor agricultural country primitive in its equipment and lacking in efficiency. Bolshevism is aiming at "changing Russia with enormous speed from a back-

ward country, an agrarian country, into a progressive country of large scale industry". But the same is aimed at to-day, although at a much lesser speed, by all Oriental countries. During the nineteenth century the East had been satisfied to supply to the West products of the soil and raw materials, and to import in return machinery and to form a market for industrial products and capital investment from the West. Since the world war the East has tried to emancipate itself, not only politically but economically, to secure an active participation in world economics, not to accept passively the part assigned to it by the West. The East wishes to set up its own industries, to promote their development by a protective tariff policy, to modernize its agriculture and to apply technical advance to the service of its own purposes. This effort of Europeanisation, undertaken to-day by the entire East, is carried on systematically and with an utter disregard for traditional values or for the sufferings of the individual by Bolshevism. In this way the Soviet Union becomes a pioneer in the march of the East towards the West. The policy of industrialisation aims at converting the Soviet Union from a country economically, technically and culturally behind the modern age, into a country well abreast of scientific civilisation and with a highly developed technical equipment.

This economic acculturation of Eastern lands to Western methods



must be accompanied by a psychological and cultural revolution. The Oriental Russian had little sense for time, order, preciseness. If you asked a Russian and he answered "seitchas" or "zavtra," these words meant, "instantly," or "to-morrow" according to the dictionary, but with the Russian they meant "sometime," "who knows when?" or "when it pleases God". One of the most used Russian words was "nitch-evo," which meant "nothing," but also "all right," "never mind," or "who cares for it?" The natural attitude of the Russian at his work or in his office was an easy-going carelessness; his attitude towards men and affairs was cordial and lenient but far from efficient. Bolshevism has tried to re-shape the Russian according to western standards of efficiency, to provide him with a sense of order and proportion and attention to detail. This westernising

zeal of Bolshevism has made the Soviet Government concentrate on intensive educative work, on the training and uplifting of the backward masses, on awakening their initiative, and on enlisting their active interest in public affairs. Universal education and the introduction of modern technical progress are the most powerful weapons for transformation of an eastern country into a westernised one. Russia had always been a Eurasian Empire on the borders of East and West. During the Tzar's regime the Eastern element was in the ascendancy. Bolshevism tries to enthrone the Western element. Thus far it is certainly in harmony with the spirit of the age, but the question remains open whether it is not destroying by its method and speed some of the most precious inheritance of the East, some of the most essential treasures of humanity.

HANS KOHN

## THE THREE LISTENERS

[G. V. Ketkar, B.A. LL.B., is a lover and a student of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and has done much to popularize its message.—EDS.]

Three men listened to the message—but with three different results! The way in which you listen to the message determines its effect on you. The meaning of the message is as broad and as deep as is the ocean. But, as the Sanskrit saying goes, every pot will take the water according to its own capacity.

Arjuna, Sanjaya and Dhritarashtra—three men heard the Lord's Song—the *Bhagavad-Gita*. The Song begins with a question from old blind Dhritarashtra. He wants to know what happened on the battlefield and what was the fate of his own sons. It seems that he does not care to know anything beyond that. He is blind not only in the physical sense, but in the spiritual sense also. His affection for his own sons and his anxiety for their welfare blinds him to everything else. The tide of knowledge is flowing in the message, but not a drop enters his mind. It is closed against it. Dhritarashtra has no word of appreciation, no comment or remark to offer on the wonderful manner in which spiritual knowledge was revealed to Arjuna in the divine message. Throughout the *Gita* he is silent so we have no evidence in the *Gita* itself as to how far the message was understood by the blind old man. Elsewhere in the *Maha-*

*bharata* we find that Dhritarashtra was really pained at heart and felt dejected when he heard the message. Strange is this curious attitude of Dhritarashtra. But it is true, and it has a deep lesson for all of us.

Why was Dhritarashtra grieved when he heard the *Gita* from Sanjaya? It was because he thought that as the *Gita* prepared the mind of Arjuna for the fight there was thus no chance of success for his own sons—the Kauravas. That was his only concern and curiosity in asking Sanjaya to tell him the news about happenings on the *Kurukshetra* battlefield. His mind was not open to anything else, even though it were the Divine word itself.

Sanjaya on his part could not suppress feelings of profound joy and wonder. "Again and again," says he, "I think of the Message and I rejoice." (*Gita* xviii-76). He could not also suppress his own appreciation of the message. He considered himself fortunate that he was privileged to hear it. He knew that it was Yoga explained by the greatest of Yogis—the Master of Yoga himself (*Gita* viii-75). And he drew his own moral from the story. He has put it concisely in the last verse of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. He knew that Krishna and Arjuna—the Guru and the Chela—formed a unique pair: Arjuna ready with his bow



and arrow to fulfil his painful duty and Shri Krishna the Master of Yoga teaching him to preserve his inner calm in the tumultuous surroundings of a disastrous war. Where these two qualities combine there will be perpetual success, prosperity and power. (*Gita* xviii-77.)

In a metaphorical way Sanjaya has expressed the key of the *Gita*'s greatness. The combination of action and peace of mind forms the core of the teaching. Arjuna in the beginning of the *Gita* was a man of action without that deep philosophy which backs the action with the force of inner conviction. Without Yoga the bow and arrow and even the strong hand that wielded them became hesitating and weak. With Yoga they derived infinite strength. This was figuratively explained by Sanjaya in the combination of Arjuna and Shri Krishna. In one stroke Sanjaya has brought out both the external and internal significance of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. This was because he had that sympathy with Krishna and Arjuna, whereas Dhritarashtra had none. At the end of the *Gita* Krishna tells Arjuna not to waste this message on one who has no ears to hear (*Gita* xviii-67). Unhappily Sanjaya had to perform this thankless task of telling a message to one who had no ears to hear. But Sanjaya himself had the eyes to see and ears to hear. His moral of the story has its own value. His appreciation of the *Gita* is particularly helpful to those who

are perplexed by the various interpretations put on this scripture by different schools of thought. For here is a sympathetic listener of the message who has recorded his view of it. That is more valuable than a score of commentaries.

But Sanjaya lacked one quality which is essential to a perfect listener. He must have been previously seeking the message. Sanjaya was not placed in a situation of conflicting duties. He had ears to hear the message—but they were not longing for it. On Dhritarashtra it was like seed thrown on a rock. On Sanjaya it was like seed thrown on ordinary soil. But on Arjuna it was like seed thrown on a soil duly ploughed for receiving it. The conflict of duties that perplexed him must be cleared up at once. Nothing but a definite and convincing solution of his dilemma could satisfy him. Till he could see his way clearly he would not move an inch, but would sit trembling in his armour and thinking of the dire consequences of his action one way or the other. Should he fight for the truth to the bitter end or should he give it up, at a critical moment, allowing his enemies to finish their own dreadful design as they liked? He would throw away the wealth of the whole world if the true solution were not put before him. He would have no peace of mind till then. And of all the people around him Krishna alone possessed the wisdom that would make his way plain. Krishna had in

his hands not only the reins of his chariot, he also had in his hands the reins that could drive Arjuna's mind to the truth through the bewildering tangle of doubts and difficulties. Arjuna must know the truth there and then, at all costs, from Krishna and Krishna alone, otherwise he is undone. Arjuna had no nerve to move one way or the other. He dropped his bow and arrow. No moral strength was left him to lift them save the conviction that he was doing the

right thing in the right way.

Dhritarashtra was unable to understand the message, Sanjaya appreciated it properly, but Arjuna translated it into action. "I know the right thing and the right way and I will do it"—that was his answer to the message. (*Gita* xviii-73.) His appreciation was action itself. He answered the message by following it.

The right way to look at the *Gita* is to look at it through the eyes of Arjuna.

G. V. KETKAR

Some one has said—Goethe I think—that the old pagan religions taught man to look up, to aspire continually toward the greatness which was really his to achieve, and thus led him to regard himself as but little less, potentially, than a God; while the attitude of man under the Christian system is one of humility, of bowed head and lowered eyes, in the presence of his God. In approaching the "jealous God" of the Mosaic dispensation, it is not permissible to assume an erect position. Thus a change of attitude becomes necessary as soon as we postulate a Deity who is outside and beyond us. And yet it is not due to the Christian scriptures in themselves, but solely to the wrong interpretation given them by priests and churches, and easily believed by a weak humanity that needs a support beyond itself on which to lean. The Aryans, holding that man in his essence is God, naturally looked up to Him and referred everything to Him. They, therefore, attributed to the material of the body no power of sight or feeling. And so Dhritarashtra, who is *material existence*, in which thirst for its renewal inheres, is blind.

—W. Q. JUDGE, *Notes on the Bhagavad-Gita*, pp. 11-12



## THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

[Ronald A. L. Armstrong is the Editor of the *Sufi Quarterly*. The description of the process of reincarnation given in this article is not a happy one though it has a basis of truth. Many who read the Buddhistic books fail to grasp the important teaching about the Skandhas. Similarly our esteemed contributor who is trying to present the Sufi point of view has not distinguished between the personality built of Skandhas and the individuality—the indivisible soul. Personality is not the surviving soul; the constituents of that personality are mortal; their transformation between death or disintegration and birth or re-assemblage must not be mistaken for the activity of the individuality, the soul, the real man who is immortal. After death the personality disintegrates like the body, but the individuality survives and returns.—EDS.]

In her article in *THE ARYAN PATH* for January Dr. Margaret Smith explained the attitude of certain Islamic sects towards the doctrine of reincarnation. Dr. Smith is an authority on Islamic mysticism. Her articles on that subject in *THE ARYAN PATH*, and her various books, have been authoritative contributions for which we cannot be too grateful. But she is forced to admit that, for the most part, Islam looks upon reincarnation as a heresy, and that the Sufis, the mystics of Islam, reject the idea altogether.

To the article the editors have, however, prefixed a significant statement. They say that "the Sufis very probably taught Reincarnation, in some mystic form in their exoteric degree, reserving for their esotericists the details of the doctrine."

I want, to discuss that suggestion now—and to explain in more detail the Sufi attitude to the whole question. It should not be forgotten that words are poor means to the discussion of mystic truths. We are all, in some sense, blind—and must remain so, ecsta-

tic vision apart, until our inner eyes are opened. An intellectual approach to such questions is nevertheless permitted, and even desirable, if so be that we recognise to the full the limitations of mental capacity.

Do the Sufis, in reality, condemn the idea of reincarnation? I myself have never found any reference to this belief in the works of the Sufi poets and philosophers, while the late Professor Browne of Cambridge, perhaps the greatest authority on the matter in recent years, states categorically in his *A Year Amongst the Persians* that "metempsychosis, so far as I have been able to ascertain, is uncompromisingly denied by all Persian philosophers". I admit, however, that possibly there are carefully veiled mystic allusions to the idea, for exoteric students. That is a matter for elaborate study. Important such allusions, even if they exist, can never have been. And for these two reasons. Firstly, and of least consideration, reincarnation was heresy to the orthodox in Islam. Already under

suspicion as "free-thinkers," the Sufis could in no way better protect themselves (and, in ancient times especially, their lives) than by open denial of a particularly dangerous doctrine, whatever they thought in their hearts. This they could do the more easily in that, and secondly, reincarnation belongs to a category of conceptions that have, for the Sufi, no vital significance. Why is that?

A Sufi *Murshid* of our own time has put the case most aptly and I cannot do better than quote him here. He used to say he had been asked one day by a Hindu *Guru* about this theory of reincarnation which was, the latter claimed, absent from Sufi writings and never expounded in their schools. The *Guru* added that he could not understand how such great and perfect beings as there are among the Sufis, known and recognised by the spiritual world, could ignore this idea, and enquired if the Sufis held to any definite belief in the matter. The *Murshid* replied that they were, indeed, aware of this problem, but that for them it was beside the point. The principal business of a Sufi, he said, is to deny his limited personality and affirm the sole existence of God, in order that the false ego, which is subject to births and deaths, may fade away, and the true ego, which is the Divine hidden in man, may rise and discover itself. In this lies the fulfilment of the main object of creation. The Sufi thinks that what is past and unknown to him, is of little use to

him; what is coming and not known, is an unnecessary worry for the present time. He believes *just now* to be all that is important, and if *just now* can be made as he wishes it to be, he desires nothing better. Among the Hindus, continued the *Murshid*, the belief in reincarnation is prevalent, and yet the greatest principle of the *Vedanta*, from which all the different beliefs of the Hindus are derived, is *Advaita* or *no duality*—in other words *unity*. "May I then ask," he concluded, "if this, the principal teaching of the *Vedanta*, is better promulgated by thinking about the doctrine of reincarnation, or by leaving it alone?" That is a mystic conception:—the One-ness of God and man first, and the details of the journey thither so much second that a serious man will not stop to consider them.

In *esoteric* practice, questions will none the less come up, and intellectuals among the Sufis will allow the problem to be brought before them. Their guides will, I believe, sometimes give indications of an attitude to follow—so that the editors of *THE ARYAN PATH* are right in their suggestion. What is this attitude, to be turned over by the initiate in his mind? I have had it explained to me by a Sufi *Sheikh* of exceptional powers. The soul, travelling to the earth from Eternal One-ness, gathers specific personality and individuality as, radiating from the Centre of all things, it becomes more and more a separate entity. On its way, it



meets other souls returning from the earth plane. From them it learns many things. There is "give and take," buying and selling, learning and teaching (all this is, of course, metaphorically expressed). But who teaches the most? The one with the most experience, the one who is going *back home*. This latter gives the map of the journey to the soul travelling *towards* Manifestation. It is from this map that the travelling soul strikes his path rightly or wrongly. One soul may have one kind of instruction, another soul may have another kind; one soul may be clear, another may be confused. Yet they all go forward together as the travellers of a caravan, taking with them the precious information, the things which they have learned from the others on the journey. It is for this reason that every child born on earth possesses, besides what he has inherited from parents and ancestors, a power and knowledge quite peculiar to himself and different from that which his parents and ancestors possessed. Yet he does not know whence he received these gifts, nor who gave him this knowledge. Some souls are, of course, more impressionable than others. Some are deeply impressed by a personality who leaves little impression upon others. Some receive many impressions—so many that it is hard to distinguish which impression has more effect and which less. However, in the end, *one* impression is predominant in every soul. Now *impression* is a

phenomenon in itself. As a man thinks, so is he. And what *does* a man think? Of that with which he is most impressed. What he is most impressed with, *that* he himself *is*. *Man is his impression*. A soul, impressed deeply by some personality coming back from the earth, becomes that personality itself, with which it is impressed. Suppose that a soul is impressed, on its way here, by the outgoing spirit of Beethoven. When born on earth, he *is* Beethoven in thought, feeling, tendency, inclination, and knowledge. Only, in addition to this personality, he has the heritage of his parents and ancestors. And others may be in the same case, though they will have taken the impression differently and in different degree, while the hereditary admixture of tendencies will also be different. It would not be wrong, therefore, to call this newborn soul a *reincarnation* of Beethoven. The soul itself, coming from above, has no name or form, no particular identity; it makes no difference to the *soul* what it is called. Since it has no name, it might as well adopt the name of the coat which was put on it—that is to say, the predominating personality with which it is impressed. The robe of Justice put on a person makes him a Judge, and the uniform of a policeman makes him a constable; but the Judge was not born a Judge, nor the constable a policeman. They were born on earth nameless, if not formless. Distinctions and differences belong to the lower

world, not to the higher.

There is something more to be considered. In taking an impression, and with it an individuality, the soul borrows property, as it were—some in the spheres beyond the grave, as it comes in, and some with its physical heredity. Taking over this property, it also takes upon itself the taxation, obligations, and other responsibilities that go with it. Often the property is not in good repair, or damage has been done to it, and it falls to the new soul's lot to repair it—or, if there is a mortgage on the property, that also becomes the new soul's charge. Together with the property, it becomes owner of the records and contracts of this property it now holds. In this is to be found the secret of what is called *Karma*.

That brings us to a point of supreme importance in discussing the Sufi attitude. The *Sheikh* objected to any insistence on the idea that a man's *karma* must *necessarily* drag him back to earth for a period or periods of reincarnation. He said that precautions must be taken that the door be left open for souls who wished to enter the Kingdom of God, that they might not feel bound by this dogma. This is the mystic speaking, not the theologian. He felt it important that a man should dwell always on the *divine* nature of his soul, and therefore the eternally-present *possibilities* of its coming to fulfilment and god-consciousness, here or hereafter. To hold before oneself the probability of a series of reincar-

nations is firstly to concentrate on one's individuality, that "ego" which is the mystic's greatest foe, and secondly to foster a certain sluggishness in one's attitude towards final realisation—if that is not for me *yet*, why bother about it? Such an attitude is the exact reverse of the Sufi conception of re-union at any moment through the power of Love.

The Sufi's feeling about *karma* is similar. Certainly he admits the scientific relations of Cause and Effect—what a man sows, that he must reap—but he qualifies his belief in this dogma by remembering the power of the God Within.

In a sense, then, though, for the reasons given, the Sufi sets the doctrine of reincarnation on one side as unimportant, it may yet be said that within the esoteric circle he admits it. He allows, that is to say, that a man's personality, plus his *karma*, can return to this plane again and again through the impression it makes upon incoming souls. The Sufi, I think, would put it like this:—*Who* is such and such a man? Is he, so far as his personality is concerned at the time of death, identified with his earthly and emotional attributes or with his purely spiritual qualities? It may safely be said that nearly every single individual born into the world is, in his heart of hearts, more or less solidly identified with his individuality, and that "the flight of the Alone to the Alone" is beyond the reach of the vast majority of mortals. Reincar-



nation, therefore, is admissible even by the Sufis. The mass of men reincarnate; hence, roughly, the doctrine of reincarnation is true. But the Sufi will not admit that reincarnation is an *absolute* rule or *necessary* consequence. There is the *great* reservation to be made about the actual soul. The *soul itself*, according to the Sufis, can never reincarnate. The personality returns, perhaps: impressed on another soul. But the soul itself, on its journey from Heaven, through Earth, to Heaven again, touches the earth-plane once and once only. It itself is nameless and formless and divine. Little by little the veils of separate identity drop away from it, and it approaches once more the Source of its origin. The Sufi *Sheikh* I have already quoted, speaks of this return of the soul to its home, and how it may be a conscious or unconscious return. I should like to quote his eloquent words here:—

The soul, drawn by the magnetic power of the Divine Spirit, falls into It with a joy inexpressible in words, as a loving heart lays itself down in the arms of its Belovèd. The increasing of this joy is so great that nothing the soul has ever experienced in its life has made it so unconscious of the self as this joy does; but this unconsciousness of the self becomes in reality the true Self-consciousness. It is then that the soul realises fully that "I exist". But the soul which arrives at this stage of realisation *consciously*, has a different ex-

perience. The difference is like that of one person having to be pulled, with his back turned, to the Source—and another person having journeyed towards the Goal enjoying at every step each experience it has met with, and rejoicing at every moment of this journey in approaching nearer to the Goal.

One last word with reference to the Soul and the doctrine of Reincarnation. The Sufi attitude to these questions resembles, I think, that of the Buddhists. The Soul goes on, the Personality comes back—so the Sufis say—and yet the Eternal Soul is undivided and "in every place without moving". The Buddhists explained by the simile of a candle: "If a candle is lit from another, the light does not pass from one to the other, but there is a continuity of the process." Or if asked: is it the same being that is reborn or another? they would reply, "Neither the same nor another." It is not the same, then, who does a deed and who receives the recompense or punishment for this deed? "It is not the same, but neither is it another, for without the thirst of the one, the other would not have arisen." They also used another simile:—

If somebody plants a tree and another later steals the fruits of that tree, can the thief plead as an excuse that he did not take the property of the other, for the other owns only the tree which he planted, but not its fruits? No, for without the tree the fruits would not exist.

RONALD A. L. ARMSTRONG

## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL POISONER

[C. J. S. Thompson, M. B. E., is a specialist who has written numerous volumes on the mystery of things—of Perfumes, of Alchemy, of Pharmacy; he is the author of *Poison Mysteries in History, Romance and Crime*, and *Poisons and Poisoners*.—EDS.]

The history of great poisoning cases shows that as a rule the crime of murder by poison is planned in secrecy. The poisoner acts alone and rarely attempts the administration of the lethal dose in the presence of another person.

Criminal poisoning is therefore not a matter of sudden impulse but is usually thought out a considerable time beforehand, for the poisoner sets about his plans with the utmost cunning so as to avoid suspicion or detection.

Every crime that is committed is committed when the reasons for doing it outweigh the reasons for not doing it. The principles of good and evil in the individual will really battle with each other, and when the latter overcome the former, the decision to carry out the crime is accompanied by the dread of discovery and punishment. In endeavouring to analyse the motives of the poisoner, should there be any, we usually find that they fall into several defined classes; but such is the strange working of the human mind, that what to some person might seem a wholly adequate motive for causing but a slight injury, might to another seem to justify in their mind the crime of murder. Thus the study of the psychology of the criminal poisoner is complex in more senses than one.

The action of the poisoner may be the result of psychological mechanisms to which any average person is exposed. It is not confined to any one class or type of individual. He or she may be well-educated, intelligent and apparently a perfectly normal person. On the other hand, the individual may be of a coarse nature, callous and ignorant, with brutish and cruel instincts.

Thus we find, that if in the environment of an individual a peculiar combination of circumstances prevails which renders it extremely difficult or impossible to satisfy some strong desire by any course of action permitted by convention, a state of mind is produced which prompts him to break the code. The whole purpose of his emotion is to induce him to action. His mind becomes dominated by one idea, and such is its power that it blinds him to facts and arguments in so much that, at the time, there appears no risk in carrying out his design.

In planning the crime of murder by poison it is probable that but few deliberately weigh the risk, for craft and cunning play such an important part in the mind of the poisoner that he thinks detection almost an impossibility.

His object to remove the barrier or obstruction that stands in



the way to the attainment of his desire becomes such an obsession, that he sets out to accomplish it by that silent weapon of death at a time when it is least likely to cause suspicion to rest upon himself. It is typical of the poisoner that he takes no account of human suffering or of agonising pain. Whether he employs arsenic or strychnine, he only looks for the desired end. He must carefully think out and decide how the poison is to be administered and when.

In Europe, during the Middle Ages, such plots became so common that poison came to be more feared than the assassin's knife, and the professional poisoner played an important part in these political dramas. In the fifteenth century, certain European States formally recognised secret assassination by poison, as shown in the still existing records of the notorious Council of Ten. From them we learn that on December 15th 1543, John of Ragusa offered the Council a selection of poisons and declared himself ready to remove out of the way any person whom they deemed objectionable. The Presidents, Guolando Duoda and Pietro Guiarini placed this offer before the Council on January 4th 1544, when it was resolved to accept this patriotic offer and to experiment first on the Emperor Maximilian. John had drawn up a regular tariff for the removal of distinguished personages, which was graduated according to their rank. Thus for a King his fee was 150 ducats, for

a Duke 60 ducats and for a Marquis 50 ducats.

But the use of poison as a political weapon in Europe began to wane in the sixteenth century after an attempt on the life of Queen Elizabeth by a man called Squire, who placed poison on the pommel of the saddle of a horse she was about to ride, in the pious hope that her hand having come in contact with the poison, it might in some way be introduced into her mouth or nostrils. The last attempt to remove political personages by poison in England was in 1917, when a plot to kill the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) and his colleague Mr. Henderson by means of certain poisons was discovered—a plot instigated by some misguided women who did not believe in the policy pursued in the Great War by these members of the Government.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, besides the customary methods of administration in food or wine, the secret poisoner often attempted to remove his victim by causing him to absorb some powerful poison through the skin; hence we have the many picturesque stories of the use of poisoned gloves, boots, shirts and other articles of apparel. An instance of the employment of this method in India occurs in the legendary story of the Queen of Ganore, who is said to have killed Rajah Bukht by impregnating his marriage robes with poison. Todd also records the deaths of several historical personages in India who

are said to have succumbed to the effects of wearing poisoned robes.

With the object of ascertaining the predominant motives that have actuated criminal poisoners, I have made an examination of twenty notorious cases that have been tried within recent years, with the following result. In eight cases, the object of the crime was to obtain money or property; seven might be ascribed to motives of sex or lust; one to hatred or jealousy, while in the remaining five no evidence as to motive could be adduced.

With respect to the first mentioned, the motive of greed is ever a powerful one. It is common knowledge that a passion for property, especially as it involves the sense perception of money, is to be found among people of every race, and gold is the prevailing lure. Sometimes the desire for grasping of wealth, when within reach, becomes overwhelming and appears to have the same definite influence on some people as blood on a preying animal. There are cases on record in which people have been led to commit serious crimes by the mere sight of a large sum of money.

The sex motive to which seven of the twenty cases may be attributed includes such emotions as love, jealousy and hatred. The sex instinct in most individuals is primarily represented by lust. Love and hatred are only the positive and negative aspects of the same relation. But a woman's hatred is generally much

more intense than that of a man; and usually among women, hate, anger and revenge may be considered as but different stages of the same emotion. Gross, the German psychologist, declares that real hate has three sources, *viz.* pain, jealousy and love. Where sex instincts form the basis of the motive we may assume, that the mind of the individual becomes dominated by a fixed idea which becomes intensified by dwelling upon it. Some person who stands in the way of the fixed desire has to be removed. If poison is the chosen weapon, the victim must be watched until an opportunity occurs when the method, secretly planned, can be carried out without drawing suspicion on the plotter of the crime.

In considering the cases in which there appears to be a complete absence of motive for the committal of the crime, it is significant that, in the majority of these, the criminal proved to be a woman. From early times, poisoning as a "feminine" crime has been remarked by such ancient writers as Livy and Tacitus; and in studying the history of criminal poisoning it is noticeable that there has always been a high percentage of women poisoners. In the United States of America statistics show that five-eighths of the murders by poison have been carried out by women, who have either been housewives, housekeepers, nurses or servants. In France also from statistics covering twenty-one years, between 1851 and 1872,



the women accused of criminal poisoning numbered 399 against 304 men charged with this class of crime.

The question arises why should women more than men be given to this form of crime? In answer to this, a well-known psychologist observes that every murder, except that by poison, requires courage, the power to do, and physical strength, and as a woman does not usually possess these qualities she spontaneously makes use of poison; hence there is nothing extraordinary or significant in the fact. It is due to the characteristics of the sex. Women certainly have special facilities and opportunities for administration, as in the majority of cases the lethal dose is mixed with food or drink which is naturally prepared by a woman. A famous psychologist goes so far as to say with regard to criminal poisoners, "where evidence does not point to a woman, look for an effeminate man who has feminine characteristics, as the perpetrator".

As an instance of the type of criminal poisoner who works without any apparent motive, mention may be made of Helen Jégado, a domestic servant, in France, who was suspected and tried for having caused the deaths of twenty-three persons. She is described as being a common hard-featured woman of repulsive appearance, with dull expressionless eyes. It was noticed that wherever she had been employed mysterious deaths had occurred,

and in her last situation where she had been cook, seven people had died after undergoing terrible sufferings. She had nursed each one with devotion, for as she later confessed "she neither hated nor was jealous of anyone but was really fond of her victims". She was utterly callous to human suffering and appears to have been irresistibly impelled to crime by her evil disposition. At her trial she admitted that she had administered the poison to her victims as it gave her actual pleasure to watch them die.

Another case was that of Anna Schönleben, a German woman, who appears to have had no compunction in murdering any one who stood in the way of her ambition. While employed as a housekeeper in a family, she poisoned two people and attempted the life of a baby. At her trial she also admitted that she was amused by the sufferings of her victims, and had a real passion for poisons generally. After being convicted for her crimes, she declared in Court that her death would be fortunate for mankind as it would have been impossible for her to have abandoned the practice of poisoning.

A still more curious case was that of Jeanne Gilbert, a young French woman, who was charged with having poisoned eleven people in and near the village where she lived in the south-west of France. During a period of two years, ten people had died under mysterious circumstances in the district with symptoms

pointing to arsenical poisoning, but no suspicion appears to have been aroused until a Madame Pallot, who lived in the village, was seized with a sudden illness after eating a portion of a small cheese she had found on her window-sill one morning, which she took to be a gift from a neighbour. She died within three hours, and the remains of the cheese, on being analysed, were found to contain a large quantity of arsenic. By a curious chain of circumstances the possession of a considerable amount of arsenic was traced to Jeanne Gilbert the wife of a farmer in the village, and she was arrested and charged with the crime. At her trial she admitted having purchased the arsenic which, she declared, she had used for killing rats, and for this purpose had placed it in small cheeses, specially prepared, and left them about. She was careful however to put them where her intended victims might find them, and they had accepted them as anonymous gifts. No motive whatever could be assigned for the terrible series of crimes brought home to her, but she was convicted and executed.

It is noteworthy, in cases of this kind, that the poisoner is not satisfied with one victim but often repeats the crime several times. It would appear as if such criminals were the subjects of irresistible obsessions beyond their control.

The homicidal type who distributes poison indiscriminately is more common in the eastern than

the western hemisphere. In India, where arsenic has probably been more generally used than any other substance for criminal poisoning in secret, particulars are difficult to obtain; but the reports of the official analyst of the Bombay Government show that some types of the homicidal poisoner have been common for the last fifty years. The criminal, who is generally described as a "strange woman," is said to mysteriously appear in some bazaar or street and, during her peregrinations, distributes some sweetmeats of one kind or another impregnated with arsenic. Before suspicion is aroused, she manages to disappear in the crowd and is not seen again.

One typical case recorded is that of a man who went into a shop and entered into friendly conversation with a stranger he met there. Before leaving, the stranger courteously presented him with some sweetmeats which he took away and distributed among his friends. The result was that five men and a boy were seized with symptoms of poisoning, but meanwhile the "stranger" had disappeared and could not be found.

The importance of the study of the psychology of the criminal is now engaging the attention of the police in several countries in Europe; and from it, it is thought possible that, in the future, some method may be evolved which will prove of considerable value in the prevention of crime.

C. J. S. THOMPSON



## CORRECT AND INCORRECT THINKING

## THE USE OF ANALOGY, SYMBOLISM AND PARABLE

[ I. Shaw Maclaren is the author of *Res Relictae* and *What and Why*, two epistemological volumes. In this suggestive article he values more correctly than is ordinarily done the power of analogy and symbol in mind training. Esoteric philosophy regards analogy as the guiding law in Nature, the only true Ariadne's thread that can lead us to the solution of deep mysteries. As to symbols—the attention of our author and others like him may be drawn to the following aphorism: "Every symbol must yield three fundamental truths and four implied ones, otherwise the symbol is false."—EDS. ]

The senses are avenues through which comes all the first hand knowledge we have of the outer world. They are the gateways of our knowledge of physical things. To all primarily this world is a sense world, a world of things that can be seen, of noises that can be heard, a world of whose shape and character the senses tell us, a world of common sense.

What the senses give us is confined to first-hand impressions of the outer physical world. Through the avenues of sense are brought in the raw material of knowing, like the loads of fruit and vegetables coming in to market in the early morning. But we have a power that enables us to assort these impressions as the market men assort and arrange their goods, to group these impressions and manipulate them, and that power is called reason. Reason is the second instrument of knowledge. Its business is to pass the raw material of the senses through the transmuting mills of the mind and to supply us with the product in the shape of rational knowledge. Rational knowledge is dif-

ferent in kind from sense knowledge. Rational knowledge is knowledge of the physical world at second-hand after it has been metamorphosed by reason. The whole rough product of the senses is thrown into the factory of reason to be returned in due season arranged, rectified and codified in the shape of the physical sciences.

The methods of our second kind of knowledge are those of exactitude fitted to deal with material things which it arranges according to the laws which govern and limit the use of reason. These methods are numerative and logical. The data with which it deals in common with its results are positive and definite. It takes our knowledge of the stars, gained by means of sight and artificially extended sight, subjects it to the laws of causation and numeration, and gives us back the more or less finished product in the shape of astronomy. It takes our knowledge of matter gained through carefully adapted use of the senses, subjects it to the laws of causality and returns us the science of chemistry. Science is the product

of reason acting upon the data of the senses. The data of the senses are all of the physical material world and the dealings of science are all with the physical material world.

As these two instruments of knowledge, the senses and reason, confine their presentations to objects of the outer world, does the sum of these presentations constitute the whole corpus of our awareness? Have we no knowledge of our inner selves, of what is variously called our heart, our passions, our spirit, our soul? And if so how is such knowledge obtained and what are its methods and its nature? Reason is dumb on the subject of the soul. Its methods of measuring and numbering fall useless when applied to the intangible.

Let it be called what it will, the world of the soul, the affairs of which the heart speaks, of which literature speaks, the affairs with which art deals, the ethical world, the world in which such things as beauty and goodness have their being,—this world which occupies the thoughts of humankind is not attained to either through the senses or through reason. A knowledge of it cannot be imparted from one human being to another except by means of symbols but these symbols are drawn from the sensual physical world. The power of making use of symbols, of using physical phenomena as symbols of another world of things, of drawing *analogies*, is the third instrument of knowing, and the knowledge gained by it

is the third kind of knowledge.

A symbol never gives an accurate representation of any spiritual process but only a loose idea of it. Consequently in every instance, as only giving an inadequate and free general notion of what it is meant to represent, being by its nature indefinite, it can never be used as a premiss in definite logical or rational processes of thought, but must be dealt with in the manner and fashion peculiar to analogy.

All our knowledge of things which are not physical material things takes the form of imagery drawn from the sensual world. There is no other manner in which you could deal with non-physical processes such as the emotions than by giving them a temporary physical dress. In language these pictures or images are called metaphors, and the greater part of language in ordinary current use is metaphorical in its texture and is thus inadequate for use in logical disquisition. Being but loose imagery and elastic analogy such language is not armed for service where the premisses of rational thought require apposite, accurate definition.

The whole of our knowledge of the non-physical, non-material world must be expressed in terms of analogy. Every word that can be used in this third form of knowledge is used with its secondary or symbolical, not with its primary or physical meaning. Take any word by way of example. Take "depth," for



instance. When the word "depth" is used in connection with such a metaphysical entity as sorrow it has to be rid of its corpulence first. Sorrow may be said to be deep, but you cannot say it is six feet deep. Or take the word "weight". You can speak of a weight of care, but the word "weight" must before this is done be rudely abrupted from its physique.

A farmer wishing to learn of the condition of his fat pigs gains the required knowledge by touch and sight. This kind of knowledge is sensual knowledge. Should he wish to know if it will pay him to sell them in their present condition he brings his arithmetical calculation into action and thus acquires reasoned information on the subject. This is rational knowledge. If he wishes to drive these pigs to market o'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, he may do so; but this kind of moor and fen is not the kind of moor and fen he sings of in church on Sunday, which is moor and fen gazetted for use by the ethical faculty, moor and fen acting as accredited symbols of a portion of ethical knowledge. Scarcely an object of nature but has been roped in at some time or place for analogical use by the ethical faculty. The whole paraphernalia and linguistic furniture of hymns ancient and modern is analogy set to music, and when we sing of rocks of ages, doors ajar, beautiful rivers, golden thrones, and fountains of blood, we are correctly

drafting in the sensual world to take its place when analogised as ethical knowledge.

There should really be no difficulty or confusion in their uses, as the lines of demarcation separating the three sorts of knowledge are distinct and clear. There is no overlapping. The sense faculty, the rational faculty and the ethical faculty together enacting with their special processes cover the whole field of human consciousness.

To find spiritual methods properly applied one should look at the methods employed by correctly operating ethicists. The parable methods of Jesus of throwing bare spiritual processes are in order. The imagery of Shakespeare, the myths of Plato, the metaphors of Paul—these are instances of correct thinking. Every real moralist has used the method of symbols whether those symbols have taken the form of allegories, parables, tales, stories, fables, or myths, or whether they have taken the form of monuments or pictures of architecture, or of sculptured stone. The most common form of symbolism is metaphor, and the use of this, often unsuspected, is the source of endless confusion.

It is easy to see the metaphorical character of much language as soon as a moment's thought is given and it is only necessary to take a step back into their original tongue to see the analogy that underlies such words as "conversion," "salvation," "tribulation," and hosts of others. One has only

to go a few steps farther back still and the metaphor encrusted in "soul," "spirit," or "character" becomes clear. The word "character" meant originally the dried-up bed of a mountain torrent, and when an early thinker came to give a name to that spiritual thing which he could not see or lay hands upon, but which he otherwise perceived, that is to the record in each man of his past actions and ancestry, he could think of no better image than the dried-up bed of a mountain stream which shows by the torn-up banks and de-rooted trees, the stranded logs and piled-up rocks, the history of many a winter spate and stormy freshet. He therefore applied the same name to the two things, and the identical word had thenceforth to do double duty. It has two uses, the one applied to a definite logical physical process, the other to an indefinite analogical spiritual process. It is the same with the word "spirit" or with the word "soul". "Soul" comes from a word originally meaning ocean. Nothing seemed to represent that vague, imponderable, indefinite, spiritual entity which we now call the soul so well as the wide and limitless ocean which reflects every passing ray of light and darkens its gloomy depths at the approach of evening. The physical ocean, however, can be sounded with a plummet and its depth measured with scientific accuracy, but the other kind of ocean says to your scientific methods, "ha, ha!" The radically metaphorical nature of these

words has become superficially dimmed by time and use and they are now employed by inaccurate thinkers as if they represented so many definite entities like so many sticks and stones; but words such as these only make a rough shape at fitting indefinite spiritual processes and it is a fool's game to try to use them as one would use sticks and stones. The living pages of great writers glow with an abundance of fresh-minted metaphors. In ordinary service hacked and worn ones pass free and useful currency.

Within these three forms or faculties or departments the whole body of real knowledge is built up. But outside and beyond this world of achieved certainty developed from sense-awareness unfortunately is found another world the world of non-sense.

Each faculty is required of necessity to confine its functioning within its allocated sphere. A person approaching an object of the soul such as religion may allowably for the moment neglect the use of his sense of smell, and overlook his skill in mathematics, but he must set his ethical faculty afuncting. The muddled thinking and destructive confusion from which the world suffers to-day arise from a failure to segregate the separate fields of knowledge, to misemploy their uses. It is incorrect thinking to apply scientific methods to ethical subjects, just as incorrect as it would be to try to solve a mathematical problem by the use of the nose. It is incorrect thinking to attempt



to enclose imponderable spiritual objects which by their very nature are incapable of defined limits within exact definitions. To attempt to make dogmatic assertions on religious subjects is an instance of incorrect thinking. It is an infringement of a cardinal law of thought. Dogma is an excellent example of non-sense. It is the result of the rational faculty set to do work of which it is incapable. One might as well attempt to play cricket with a collar stud. An example of partial non-sense lies in the use of the word psycho-analysis. The hyphenation of an imponderable such as psyche with a physical process such as analysis may perhaps be allowed as a picturesque poetic phrase but to consider it a science is non-sense. The phrase "science of ethics" is another hybrid monster of thought suitable for the pantomime season. The age-long controversy between science and religion may be taken as a museum specimen of nonsense in its pure and crystalline state of non-sense embedded in its natural matrix of absurdity. The scientist

purely as such acquires his narrowed outlook from the neglect of a whole species of knowing. He is a one-way street man, progressing by means of his mathematical machinery with ever-increasing speed, forgetful that beyond the block there is another stream of traffic going in exactly the opposite direction. Possibly that portion of the grey matter of his brain which ought to be directing the machinery of his ethical faculty, has been deprived of the blood stream of life commandeered for the overtime working of his rational faculty. If this be so then the scientist may be claimed to be, to that extent, in a state of mental deficiency. The statement made by many scientists and claimed for truth, that this world is a mathematico-physical world alone, may be taken as the height of non-sense, it being understood that the word "height" as here used is employed in its ethical and not in its physical sense, the height referred to not being of the kind which is expanded through the physico-mathematical realms of bent space.

I. SHAW MACLAREN

## THE ABSOLUTE

[ William Kingsland, M. I. E. E., is an old student of Theosophy and the author of *The Real H. P. Blavatsky*, *The Mystic Quest*, *Rational Mysticism*, *Scientific Idealism*, *Christos*, *The Religion of the Future* and *The Great Pyramid, in Fact and in Theory*, which last was reviewed in our issue for May.—EDS. ]

The term *The Absolute* as used in philosophy has a well-defined and well-understood meaning which has evolved from the original etymological signification in the Latin *absolutus*, p.p., of *absolvere* = *ab*, from + *solvere*, to loose. This philosophical meaning attaches to a Principle or Being which or who is the ALL of the Universe, both manifested and unmanifested. It is not departing very far from the etymological derivation of the word to say that the Absolute is *absolved*, not because of what it *once* was, but because it *never* was anything from which it could be absolved. It never was anything *relative*. The word itself implies the opposite of relativity; and necessarily and logically that which is all cannot have any relation to any of its parts.

Let us examine a few of the ways in which this term has been used by writers at various times and from various points of view.

It is hardly necessary to deal with the philosophy of Kant in his recognition of a transcendent Reality beyond the reach of the intellect which is limited in its concepts by the "categories" of time, space, and causation. He left the Absolute severely alone—as, indeed, we shall see presently it ought to be, so far as speculations regarding its nature are con-

cerned.

Nor need we consider Hegel, who endeavoured to storm the Absolute by means of a special *dialectic*. Schopenhauer and von Hartmann have each contributed to the dialectic of the Absolute; but it still remains the great paradox of metaphysical speculation.

One of the clearest explanations of the nature of the concept of the Absolute by one of our modern writers is that given by the late F. H. Bradley in his work *Appearance and Reality*. The two terms *Absolute* and *Reality* are rightly used by Mr. Bradley as synonymous: for the Absolute must necessarily be the ONE Reality.

Thus he says:—

Reality is above thought and above every partial aspect of being but it includes them all. Each of these completes itself by uniting with the rest, and so makes the perfection of the whole.

He insists that the Absolute, or Reality, is "one harmonious whole". Thus he says:—

The Absolute is not many [*i.e.*, it is *Unity*], there are no independent reals. The Universe is one in this sense, that the differences must exist harmoniously within the whole, beyond which there is nothing.

He insists that Reality is *experience*; but into that question it is not necessary to enter here,



since it is a speculation as to the *nature* of the Absolute, and may possibly find a contradiction, or at all events a paradox, in the fact that logically absolute consciousness is unconsciousness. But of the nature of the Absolute as Reality contrasted with Appearance or phenomena, he says:—

Everything to complete itself and to satisfy its own claims, must pass beyond itself, nothing in the end is real except the Absolute. . . . Viewed intellectually Appearance is error. But the reality lies in supplementation by inclusion of that which is both outside and yet essential, and in the Absolute this remedy is perfected.

To this he adds a paradox—and, indeed, we must say that all statements in this relation which have any validity are paradoxical, as for example the *neti, neti* of the *Upanishads* in speaking of that which, although the ALL, is yet “not this, not that”.

The degree of reality is measured by the amount of supplementation required in each case, and by the extent to which the completion of anything entails its own destruction as such.

One can readily recognise here the correspondence of this with the paradoxical mystical teaching that the *self* must be lost in order that the *Self* may be found; or, in other words, *Self* only becomes complete in the ONE SELF, the Absolute.

What that subtle Being is of which this whole Universe is composed, that is the Real, that is the Soul, *That art Thou*. (*Chhandogya Upanishad*, VI, 9, 4.)

Going back to Plotinus we find that philosopher saying:—

You must not, therefore, conceive it [Being] to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is anything prior or posterior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the *is*, is the truest of all things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life:—if this be the case that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. (*Enn.* III,V.)

Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* says:—

To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something.

It is clear, then, that though we can *apprehend* that there must be an absolute Principle, we cannot in any wise *comprehend* It. The concept is a necessity of thought; but at the same time we must not overlook the fact that in mystical experience we also find it to be a necessity of our nature.

Some few, whose lamps shone brighter, have been led

From cause to cause to nature's secret head,  
And found that one first Principle must be.

H. P. Blavatsky tells us that the Secret Doctrine establishes as its fundamental principle

An Omnipresent, Eternal, Boundless, and Immutable PRINCIPLE on which all speculation is impossible, since it transcends the power of human conception and could only be dwarfed by any human expression or similitude.

This fundamental principle is further defined as:—

The ABSOLUTE; the *Parabrahm* of the Vedantins or the one Reality, SAT, which is, as Hegel says, both Absolute Being and Non-Being.

It is also described as *Be-ness* rather than *Being*. It is “the One Unity” in which spirit and matter, or subject and object are synthesised.

It is greatly to be regretted that in a work recently published by Dr. G. de Purucker under the title of *Fundamentals of the Esoteric Philosophy*, which professes to be an exposition of *The Secret Doctrine* of Madame H. P. Blavatsky, the noble and time-honoured conception of the Absolute Principle which is “the Rootless Root” of all things, and which is a conception common alike to philosophy, to theology, and to mysticism, to East and to West, has been stultified in a manner which can hardly fail to bring the profound philosophy of *The Secret Doctrine* into contempt with those who have not studied that work for themselves. Dr. Purucker says:—

Whence came the “Absolute,” the “Supreme Self,” or “Spirit” or Paramatman, of which we are sparks? By growth from within outwards. It was once in incalculable æons gone by, a Man. Think of the sublimity involved in this teaching; consider the almost endless æons of the past; and that what in its far, far-away origin was a spark of divinity, a spark of another and former “Absolute,” is now our “God,” our Paramatman, our “Supreme Self” of which we are verily the children, and “in which we live and move and have our being”.

In no sense whatsoever can we conceive that “the Absolute was once a man,” though we can and *do* conceive not merely that man was *once* the Absolute, but that he is never anything else.

It is true that Dr. Purucker tells us that he is not using the term *the Absolute* in the sense of Western philosophy. We should rather think he is not; but neither is he using it in conformity with Eastern philosophy or with that of *The Secret Doctrine*. Nowhere in these can he find any postulate that the Absolute or *Parabrahm* was ever anything else but ITSELF in its absoluteness. And if it can be said to be possible in any sense to have a *relative* Absolute, even such an Absolute must be the *Root* and *Source* of all that of which it is absolute, and cannot “once have been” any of its parts or manifestations.

We may grant a number, an inconceivable number, of *relative* Absolutes in the sense that they all exist within the One absolute Absolute as *aspects* of that Absolute; or, as they have sometimes been called, *Monads*—possibly but doubtfully the Monads of Leibnitz. But these Monads can only be *aspects* of the absolute Absolute because of our conditioned intellectual necessities. As Mansel pointed out long ago in his *Limits of Religious Thought*:—

That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within it the sum not only of all actual but of all possible modes of being.

Thus the real fact is not that the Absolute was *once* man, but that—if we are to use the word *once* at all—it is the other way about, and we have to say that Man was *once* the Absolute, and that his evolution (*involution* rather) is the process of re-



becoming THAT. We must in fact reverse all Dr. Purucker's concepts to have the real esoteric teaching, whether of *The Secret Doctrine* or of philosophy and mysticism in general. Every student of these knows that it is precisely the "growth from within outwards" that has led man out from his source into the limitations of his present consciousness; and that it is only by the reversal of that process, by turning *inwards*, that the consciousness of what he *is* can be regained. It is only this that can truly be called a *sublime* concept: whereas Dr. Purucker appears to think that the sublimity lies in extension and becoming.

We are approaching the concept that man *is* the Absolute even in modern psychology. Bergson tells us that "intellect has detached itself from a vastly wider reality"; that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation"; that "both are derived from a wider and higher form of existence"; and that "it is there that we must replace them, in order to see them issue forth".

This "higher form of existence" can only have its completion in the Absolute which is the Self of all selves Now. And just as we are not normally conscious of the activities of our subconscious selves, so also we are normally unconscious of the activities of our supra-conscious selves, reaching back to the One Self, where, as Bradley says, it "completes itself".

It must, I think, be the mystical rather than the philosophical aspect of the Absolute which will interest us most; this fundamental fact that the Absolute is not merely logically the Self of all selves, but that we can actually in consciousness attain to a realisation of our oneness. Without that background to our nature and being, man has no root or source; and only the common anthropomorphic conception of Man as a *created* being remains—or else blank negation. Yet there is really no difference between the "That art Thou" of the *Vedānta* and the "in Him we live and move and have our being" of St. Paul.

The great mystic achievement is the attainment of a conscious oneness with the Absolute. "In mystic states," says William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* "we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness." He then goes on to say:—

This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man with God, their speech antedates languages, and they do not grow old.

I think, however, that as regards the consciousness of the Absolute which has been attained at any time by our classical mystics, or

which can be attained by any man at the present stage of the evolution of humanity, we must enter a *caveat*. Not merely have we to note that these mystical states are rare and unenduring, and are therefore not what we mean by *attainment*; but we must also say that in none of these states has any, or can any individual reach any further than a *relative* Absolute, or that Absolute which constitutes the *Atman*, the Self, the Logos, the Unity of our own particular Solar System; while beyond that lies the unity of our particular Universe, of which astronomy now indicates the limits, as well as the existence of other such Universes: perhaps in "infinite" numbers despite Einstein's curved space-time which is "finite but unbounded". That much we may grant to Dr. Purucker's *relative* Absolutes; only, as already pointed out, these Absolutes were not *once* men, but man—if the term applies to other systems than ours—is never in Reality anything else than the Absolute.

In introducing any *time* concept in reference to the Absolute, we are not escaping from the limitations of the formal mind; and while it is true that in the mystical states of consciousness we do escape these limitations, it is not necessarily true that we have thereby reached the absolute Absolute.

We must in fact recognise that so far as the formal mind is concerned the absolute Absolute is only, as Récéjac tells us in his *Philosophy of Mysticism*, "the extreme point where we arbitrarily suspend causality, continuous and successive magnitudes; nothing but an artifice to arrest the infinite progression of our ideas". In any case, "time" has no meaning in connection with the Absolute, whether that Absolute be postulated as a relative Absolute or as the absolute Absolute.

But while it is true of the intellect that the Absolute may be regarded as "nothing but an artifice," the mystical experience shows us that in reality it is something vastly more. The mystic experience is the pledge and evidence of that "higher form of existence" of which Bergson speaks, and in the certainty of the existence of which humanity has never been lacking as an *intuition*, however feebly, or even grotesquely, that intuition may at times have been exhibited in exoteric forms of religion, or denied by materialism.

And if we men may look forward confidently to "becoming" the Absolute, it is only because it is from THAT that we have the *appearance* of having issued forth: while all the time:—

Behold I, poor fool that I was, imagined that it was I; but behold! it is, and was, of a truth, God. (*Theologia Germanica*).

W. KINGSLAND



## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

## NATURE IS ALIVE: HUMAN EGO IS SUPREME\*

[ J. D. Beresford reviews recent books of two world-famous scientists, the Indian J. C. Bose and the German Max Planck. As accredited spokesmen of modern science they proclaim two fundamentals of Theosophical philosophy—Nature is a Living Whole, and Man is the Ego Possessing the Power to Control Causes.—EDS.]

Within the limitations that its disciples have clearly defined, science, the systematic study of knowledge, has moved forward so rapidly in the course of the last hundred years that it may be said to have changed its creed from a dogmatic materialism to a kind of tolerant agnosticism.

This change is not to be found by examining the personal creed of individual scientists. Quite recently I heard a broadcast "talk" on "The Future Life" by Professor Julian Huxley in which he used precisely the same arguments and adopted the same attitude that characterised the thought of the 'nineties—of Ernst Haeckel, for example. Incidentally, Professor Huxley opened with his most illuminating statement which was to the effect that the more one studied the material body of men and animals, the more certain one became that it could not be the vehicle of an immortal soul. The reply to that might be that the intensive study of psychology on the other hand would produce in the mind of the student, a growing certainty that

the puzzling phenomena of, say, hypnotism, dual-personality, loss of memory, or healing by suggestion, could not conceivably be due to bio-chemical causes. In other words, no argument on this particular question can have any value if it is biased as the result of specialisation in one particular line of research.

Nevertheless, if we find that the individual scientist,—and more especially in this connection the biologist,—continues in the same rut that was worn for him by his predecessors more than fifty years ago, science, itself, as such, has completely changed its message in the same period of time. At the end of the last century the layman, who made a cursory study of all that science had to teach him, must have decided, on those grounds, that man was a casual by-product of cell-differentiation, a material phenomenon that endured for a certain number of years and then ceasing, for whatever cause, to react as a whole, rotted and disappeared,—a creature without past or future. To-day such a layman,

with an immensely greater task of reading before him, would be left in a condition of great uncertainty. He would find that science as a whole had no certain message for him, whether mechanistic or spiritual.

Some aspect of this change of thought may be found in the study of two recent books, both scientific. The first of them need not detain us long. Its title is *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931-32*, edited by Sir J. C. Bose. I have already had occasion in these pages to refer to Sir Jagadis Bose's researches into the sensitivity of plant life, and the interesting parallels he has been able to demonstrate between the reactions of vegetable and animal life. In doing that, he has rendered a considerable service to general knowledge by demonstrating scientifically one aspect of the truth accepted by all Theosophists, namely, that life with its attendant consciousness inheres in all matter,\* and that there is no difference in its essential nature, no definite "break" between the inorganic, the vegetable and the animal kingdoms.

In the present volume of these *Transactions*, however, we find only a record of those familiar preoccupations of the students of science, which stirs the impatience of the progressive mind, and so often provoked the contempt of Madame Blavatsky. We may pass those further experiments

that have been undertaken by the Institute to disprove various objections that have, or might have, been, raised to the original demonstrations of vegetable reactions. The scientific method demands always that assurance should be made doubly sure. But the experiments undertaken to investigate the nature and action of certain vegetable poisons on fish, seem to arise solely from an unpurposive curiosity, and the results can be of interest only to other scientists.

Our second book is of a very different type. Professor Max Planck, whose name is hardly less influential than that of Einstein in the world of Mathematical Physics, has written an essay entitled *Where is Science Going?*—and the material of it is of the very greatest interest. The main theme is that question of causation which has been influencing the development of physics for some years past: the question whether, in the microcosm of the atom, the law of cause and effect is absolutely infallible, or if we may not attribute to the electron in certain circumstances an indeterminacy that has some kind of analogy to free-will. This contention Herr Planck is not prepared to admit, but the true worth of his essay for our present purpose will not be found in his contribution to that controversy.

What should appeal to the layman in this essay, and more particularly to those who have followed the latest developments of

\* *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931-32*, edited by Sir J. C. BOSE (Longmans, Green & Co., London. 25s.)

*Where is Science Going?* By Professor MAX PLANCK (Allen and Unwin, London. 7s. 6d.)

\* Cf. *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 274, etc.



## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

## NATURE IS ALIVE: HUMAN EGO IS SUPREME\*

[J. D. Beresford reviews recent books of two world-famous scientists, the Indian J. C. Bose and the German Max Planck. As accredited spokesmen of modern science they proclaim two fundamentals of Theosophical philosophy—Nature is a Living Whole, and Man is the Ego Possessing the Power to Control Causes.—EDS.]

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physics with an intelligent, though it may be untechnical, interest, are certain clarifying statements made by Herr Planck—statements that reveal the lucidity of his own mind, and indicate that relation of Science to Religion which should presently permit of their complete reconciliation in the human mind.

I will cite two passages only in illustration of this suggestion.

The man who cannot occasionally imagine events and conditions of existence that are contrary to the causal principle as he knows it will never enrich his science by the addition of a new idea (p. 114).

And the second runs:—

The fact is that there is a point, one single point in the immeasurable world of mind and matter, where science and therefore every causal method of research is inapplicable, not only on practical grounds but also on logical grounds, and will always remain inapplicable. This point is the individual ego. It is a small point in the universal realm of being, but in itself it is a whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will and our thought (p. 161).

Now let us, in the first place, consider these statements in their original context. Taken together they may be said to define the just place of science in the realm of human knowledge. The first statement, for example, cuts away the ground from under the feet of those, (a high proportion of professional scientists), who maintain that all and every experiment must be conducted without prejudice, and that the only certain knowledge is that derived from such exact experiment.

No doubt it has been, and will

continue to be, argued that the imagining of "events and conditions," even in Herr Planck's extreme case of such events being contrary to all experience, constitutes no more than the preliminary hypothesis sometimes necessary as a direction post for experiment, and that no such hypothesis has any value until it has been proved and re-proved by a long series of direct observations. But the mind of the unprejudiced thinker, ranging far beyond the limits imposed by Science, must inevitably demand whence the incipient inspiration of the "imagination" is derived? A priest or an artist, a Roger Bacon or a da Vinci, unconfined by any scientific training whatever, may anticipate the discoveries of future ages, although their writings have no influence on their contemporaries. A Blavatsky may go still further and set out that vast plan of Being, some fraction of which has since been tediously corroborated by the methods of observation and measurement. Can we then doubt that those who draw inspirationally from the unfathomable well of knowledge are tapping the original source of wisdom, and that all the resources of science are but a secondary activity whereby some trickle of the overflow is slowly accepted by the reason and laboriously added to the list of established facts?

Herr Planck's second statement goes still deeper, indicating as it does not the source of wisdom, but our single means of interpreting and giving it expres-

sion on the material plane. For if this "ego" of ours, (using the word in Herr Planck's sense), were no more than a temporary, evanescent aggregate of material atoms, though it might in its marvellous complexity be capable of scientific knowledge, it could not originate the wisdom of a Bacon, a da Vinci or a Blavatsky. The difference between the two functions is that between two modes of being. One is mechanical, the other vital. One postulates no more than the need for an intricate interrelation of chemical reactions to diverse stimuli, the other demands a relation between the material expression of humanity and some source of infinite wisdom. In brief this "ego," this "whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will and our thought" is capable at its highest of transcending all those "laws" of matter which furnish the final tests of science. If a man be capable of imagining "conditions contrary to the causal principle" he may, also, be capable of controlling them.\*

Returning now to our unprejudiced layman, one may well imagine him as demanding with Herr Planck, though in a rather different sense: "Where is science going?" It must seem to him in Tennyson's phrase to falter where it firmly trod, to be on the verge, if it is not already over it, of saying: Science by virtue of its self-imposed limitations can

never hope to originate any theory as to the intrinsic nature of man's being, its proper field of inquiry being limited solely to the examination of the phenomena of cause and effect presented by what we know as matter.

Moreover it is worthy of remark that this last term, still accepted by Professor Julian Huxley in its original significance, must now be regarded by the physicist as incapable of definition. He may be able to recognise, classify and assign a statistical probability to the manner in which matter behaves in various circumstances, but he has now to admit that he has no more certain knowledge of what matter is, nor of what it may be capable in rare conditions, than he has of the spirit of Man.

What, then, can we say to this puzzled layman of our instance when, having failed to find any answer to his essential question in the pronouncements of Modern Science, he demands, it may be, whether this precious instrument of Reason that has been responsible for all the scientific wonders of twentieth century civilisation, must be regarded as fallible if not utterly worthless when we seek an answer to our fundamental enquiry as to the essential nature of the Universe?

Our answer to that question and to the one that preceded it, "Where is Science going?" is implicit in the second quotation made from Herr Planck's essay.

\* It must be clearly understood, however, that the principles and laws here referred to are only those deduced by observation on the material plane. No reference is intended to the higher laws of the spiritual world, such as, to quote the most familiar instance, the law of Karma.



Reason is, in fact, only an instrument, and must be regarded as such. It plays a necessary part in our daily life and science is almost entirely dependent upon it. It is a product of consciousness to which it may be said to bear some such relation as science does to Faith. For the scientist is as dependent upon faith as is, though in a very different direction, the religious convert. Every experiment in the laboratory must be made on certain antecedent assumptions, only a proportion of which are referable to deductions from previous experience. The very use of reason itself assumes an antecedent belief in its validity. In short, reason however precious a gift is a secondary phenomenon of life, dependent upon that consciousness of which faith may be said to be an aspect.

Even as I write this, for example, proceeding in what appears to my judgment as a logical sequence, I am aware that behind the intellectual activity that sorts and seeks to express my ideas, there lies a vitalising belief in my own ego, which states the first principle of Descartes in the inverted form: I

am, therefore I think. And that seems to me the proper sequence since I know that I am responsible for my reason, and am what I am as a consequence of an age-long process, and not as the result of my own thought and experience, even though I can defend that dogmatic "I know" solely on the ground of faith.

But how, finally, from such premises is it possible to answer that enquiry as to the future of Science? It has been suggested that it owes, as Herr Planck himself implies, at least some of its advance not to the use of reason founded upon experience, but to those incipient inspirations which have directed its experiments. But as we have seen, it can never by its present methods hope to answer the fundamental question "What is man?" It would appear therefore that in the future Science must take its proper place as a material activity, serving many valuable uses, but unable to furnish any evidence on the main philosophical speculation.

Like Reason, Science must come to be regarded as subsidiary to Faith, and dependent upon it.

J. D. BERESFORD

Fatalism implies a blind course of some still blinder power, and man is a free agent during his stay on earth. He cannot escape his *ruling* Destiny, but he has the choice of two paths . . . there are *external and internal conditions* which affect the determination of our will upon our actions, and it is in our power to follow either of the two.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol I, p. 639,

## PRISON AND PRISONERS\*

[G. D. H. Cole, who is a socialist and a humanitarian, reviews an important volume dealing with an important problem pressing for solution.—EDS.]

What are prisons for? Are they simply lock-ups, within which men and women who are regarded as dangers to society can be shut away, and so made incapable of further harm to their fellows? Or are they reformatories, where those who have fallen upon evil courses can be retrieved and restored for decent civic living? Or are they places of horror and despair, where men are to be made so wretched as to deter others from following their bad example? Through the centuries the conflict between these three ideas of prison persists unending: and few are they who can give a clear answer telling their own view of what a prison ought to be.

There is, indeed, nowadays much less emphasis on deterrence and far more upon reformation among those who write and think seriously about prison conditions. But in the minds of those who do not think seriously the conception of deterrence still strongly persists; and modern prisons even are largely built upon this idea. When there is a crime wave anywhere, the demand at once arises for longer sentences and more stringent prison treatment, as means of scaring off some of the potential criminals. But, as Warden Lawes points out in this book, there is not a particle of evidence

that stringency or even savagery of punishment ever deterred anybody. Indeed such evidence as there is points the other way. Those American States which have sought to combat the increase of crime by stiffening up their penal laws are not more free from crime than the rest. If there is any difference, they have more of it, and more than they had when their laws were less vindictive. But it is hard to shake out of people's minds the idea that prison life ought deliberately to be made unpleasant, even if it can be shown that the unpleasantness is likely to worsen, instead of improving, the characters of its victims. The feeling that the life of the criminal in gaol ought, even apart from the mere fact of confinement, to be worse than that of the least well-off among the innocent dies hard, even when it is seen that the greatest hardships are often inflicted, not on the prisoner, but on his unfortunate wife and children.

This, however, has at least been gained—that the idea of deterrence has become discredited among the experts, who were once loud in its praise. There remain the ideas of reformation and of mere incarceration in the public interest; and these two need not conflict all along the

\**Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing*. By Warden Lewis E. Lawes, (Constable & Co., London, 8s. 6d.)



line. For it is possible to say that the test of whether a man should be kept in prison or not, should be his dangerousness to society if he is at large, and at the same time that, when a man is shut up on this account, everything possible should be done to improve him, so as to make him suitable for early release.

This, I think, is the theory which Warden Lawes, with his long experience as Warden of Sing Sing Prison in the United States, has in his mind. He pleads strongly that the men under his care should be so used as to fit them for a resumption of normal life; and he also argues vigorously for the indeterminate sentence—that is, in effect, for a system which will allow a prisoner to be released as soon as his conduct and character seem to offer a reasonable prospect of his behaving as a decent citizen in the future.

That this view is right in principle seems clear enough. But how are we to act up to it? In the first place, a prison can only act as a reforming influence on its inmates if it is able to give them plenty of decent useful work to do, and if this work is of a sort to help them towards earning their livings honestly and usefully after their release. But this is a problem which no prison in the world (unless there be some in Russia) has yet satisfactorily solved; for as soon as prison administrators get busy setting their charges to work at the jobs most likely to be of benefit to them, there arises from

employers and workmen alike the cry that the labour of prisoners is being used to take the bread out of honest men's mouths, under unfair conditions of public subsidy. This is said whether or not the prisoners (or their dependents outside) are allowed to receive wages for their labour. Yet until this plea is firmly disregarded it is clear that the prison administrators will be set an impossible task. A high proportion of prisoners are of fairly poor mental equipment and have little or no knowledge of a definite trade. They need work and training above all else. Yet this they are nowhere allowed to have on an adequate scale, though the old severe restrictions on prison labour have been to some extent broken down in recent years.

This problem, however, can at any rate be solved as soon as we care to solve it. The other problem—of determining the duration of a man's or woman's confinement by the criterion of dangerousness to society—rouses much more formidable difficulties. For who is to make the decision, and on whose advice and recommendation is it to be made? Can we yet trust psychiatrists and prison psychologists, with their mental tests and their increasing use of psycho-analytic methods, to tell us when or whether a prisoner can safely be let out? Can we trust individual prison Governors, acting on the advice of these experts? Or can we trust any sort of tribunal of appeals? Clearly, a good prison Governor with a

real *flair* for the appreciation of character, could do far better than he can to-day if he were allowed to judge when his charges could safely be let go. But prison Governors differ like other men; and it would be impossible to hope that any system of indeterminate sentences would work out satisfactorily in every instance. There does seem, however, to be a stronger case for this than for any other system, at least in respect of prisoners sentenced nowadays to long terms. Warden Lawes pleads strongly for it; and his argument is not totally weakened by the fact that a part of it depends on the impression made by his own personality and judgment.

This book is, of course, about the United States; and certain things strike very forcibly the reader who comes from Great Britain. The first of these is the assumption, made throughout as unquestionable, that American justice is utterly uneven in its dealing with rich and poor. Again and again the author mentions, with some indignation but wholly without surprise, how rich criminals get off, or escape with light sentences, when poor men are sent up for long terms or to the electric chair. Secondly, Mr. Lawes is very emphatic not only about the influence which Prohibition has had on the increase of crime, but also about the way in which this influence has worked. It began, he tells his readers, by making crime vastly more lucrative, as well as less frowned

on by a public opinion largely made up of law-breakers. The standard of living of the criminal classes rose sharply out of the high profits of bootlegging: but very soon the number of persons anxious to share in these profits rose so fast as seriously to overcrowd the profession. The criminals, accustomed by now to their higher standard of expenditure, resorted to more and more dangerous and violent crimes in order to maintain it; and deterrent measures were utterly ineffective in checking the wave of crime. At the same time the newspapers, by glorifying the exploits of the gangsters and extracting every ounce of sensation out of the stories of bootleggers and gunmen, created in the minds of thousands of young people a passionate emulation of the life of the successful criminal, and helped to bring about a great increase in juvenile crime, and especially in juvenile crimes of violence. Mr. Lawes is most emphatic in his denunciation of the press for its share in the fostering of violence and the falsely romantic view of the life of the underworld.

He is no less emphatic in his attack on the death penalty, both for its futility as a deterrent, and because he believes that many of those who suffer it could be made into decent and useful citizens. He denounces it too as resulting in the grossest inequalities of treatment between man and man, partly owing to differences of wealth—a rich man, he says, is



practically never executed—and because of the growing reluctance to inflict it save under the impulses of popular hysteria. The death penalty has been abolished already in some of the American States; and these have no more crime than the others. May it disappear soon all over the world!

I feel that in this review I have said far too little about Warden Lawes's book as a whole and too much about those parts of it which deal with principles and controversial issues. A large part of it consists of an account of his own experiences as a prison official, and it is richly adorned with accounts of particular persons and events. Its weakness is that it gives too unclear an impression of what the real running of Sing Sing is like. Warden Lawes is hostile to the theory of prisoners' self-government on which his famous predecessor, Osborne, attempted to act. He holds that prison government must be benevolent despotism, and not democracy; and that privileges granted by the administration must remain always privileges revocable at will, and must never become rights. The prisoners are there to be disciplined, and guided back under discipline to better citizenship. They are there, for the most part, because they are unfit to govern themselves; and as soon as they are fit to do this, he holds that they should be let go. Till then a hand firm as kind is necessary.

This seems sound; but what it means in practice depends very much on the conditions under

which the administrator works. How much freedom has he in finding the right sort of work for his men? How well are the prison buildings and equipment adapted to the needs of a reforming policy? How much discretion does the law allow in the granting of special privileges, as well as in the remission of sentences? In Russia, I am told, prisoners are regularly allowed to go home at the week-ends, and to earn wages in gaol for the support of their dependants. They have far more freedom of movement, and are far less under a sense of social degradation than prisoners in any other country. Only the political offenders are apt to have a hard time in Russia. The common criminal is subject to a procedure which assumes that to make a man wretched is the worst way of making him a better citizen. Warden Lawes, I think, has worked towards this idea as far as the laws of the United States have allowed. But I fancy he is too much the paternal despot to go all the way with the Russians. Yet all that way, I feel, we must go if we are to be justified in putting men and women in prisons at all. It is hard to justify on any account: it is impossible unless we can reconcile the life of the prison with reasonable human well-being and with the expectation that most of the prisoners will come out better citizens than they went in. That cannot be, if during their prison life they are to be utterly cut off from normal sex relations and

contacts with their wives and families save under the artificial conditions of a prison visit. In Russia, prisoners who are allowed home for the week-end seldom run away. In capitalist countries, they would doubtless run away more; for such countries offer both greater chances of escape and far more opportunities for successful crime. But is not that

a part of the indictment of capitalism—that through economic inequality it breeds crime, and the opportunity for crime? Warden Lawes has had a hard task; for America must be the hardest place wherein to govern a prison well, crime having there the most specious glamour and the most abundant opportunity.

G. D. H. COLE

### DURATION AND TIME\*

[ Prof. Mahendranath Sircar of Calcutta Sanskrit College is the author of *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture*, *Comparative Studies in Vedantism and Mysticism in the Bhagavat-Gita*; his *Mysticism in the Upanishads* is to be shortly published. In this scholarly review he points out how the late Professor Mead of Chicago arrives at "an element of indeterminism" like the German Max Planck whose book is reviewed elsewhere in this number. Students of H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* will note the similarity of teachings about Eternity and Duration or Periodicity and Boundlessness of Time; the latter now called "is-ness," is the "Be-ness", a term coined by her to render more accurately the essential meaning of the untranslatable Sanskrit *Sat*, which is neither Being nor Non-being. Our readers' attention may be drawn to *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, pp. 37 and 44.—EDS.]

Original and subtle is the work done by Professor Mead. His work justifies his characterisation by Dewey as "a seminal mind of the very first order". This volume raises many important problems; the central theme is the conception of the Present. This conception is applied to the study of emergence, sociality, and self, in the first four chapters, which contain the main thesis of the book. Four more chapters have been appended as supplementary essays.

The present has been defined as the locus of reality. Reality exists in the present. The present, of course, implies "a past and a future and to those both we deny existence". The conception of the specious present suggests a temporal spread, which could take in the whole of temporal reality but would eliminate the past and the future.

Prof. Mead conceives the present as continuous with the past and as emergent out of it. The main question that he considers in relation to the present is the status of its past. The distinctive character of the past in relation to the present is mainly that of irrevocability. The past is that out of which the present has arisen and is an irrevocability. But this identical relation is never the whole story. The doctrine of emergence compels us to believe that the present is in some sense novel, something not completely determined by the past out of which it arises.

The present, so far as it is new, will have in it "an element of temporal and causal discontinuity". Mead seems to reconcile the novelty of the present with scientific determinism; but how? This leads us to the basic principle of his theory. The past does not contain the

\* *The Philosophy of the Present*. By GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, edited by Arthur E. Murphy, with a preface by John Dewey (Open Court Publishing Co., London.)



present before it is emerged. There is an element of indetermination in the present.

Mead is anxious to retain the continuity between the past and the present, and at the same time to regard the present as something new. And this he does by taking the past in two different senses. The irrevocable past is the past of any given present. Its determining condition will "be ideally, if not actually, fully determinable in the present, to which it is relative". But when a new present arises with emergent facts, not containing the former present, its determining conditions, hence its past, will be of necessity different.

New objects are continually arising and a new present re-orientates the subtle conditions of an older era. The old view in Philosophy regards the past as for ever passed. Mead thinks that the relation of the past to the present is the ground of its pastness.

He describes the relation between Emergence and Identity: "All of the past is in the present as the conditioning nature of passage, and all the future arises out of the present as the unique events that transpire." The emergent is a unique growth, unique in the sense, that it is not either the full *repetition* or the complete divergence from Identity. The former takes away its meaning, the latter denies the historical continuity. The emergent is really improvement upon the identity, and it puts a new colour upon it from the perspective that it creates.

He holds, especially in criticising Alexander, that the past which physics requires is simply the expression of identical relations in nature, not an antecedent environment existing in itself and giving rise in its identical being to all subsequent reality.

This past is dead past, and not the living one which grows in temporal transition. This temporal transition is a unique sort of relativity and it gives us a kind of temporal perspective or "system". This temporal perspective has a centre, from which its relation

to past events is organised, and what is emergent from our social standpoint will follow from and be reflected in the past of another. But, at the same time, Mead is very eloquent in his affirmation that "every event by which it becomes possible to differentiate passage cannot be resolved into the conditions under which event happens".

Prof. Mead then goes on to describe the sociality of emergence. It implies sociality as the capacity of being *several things at once*. The new emergent event must be in two systems in such a way that "its presence in the latter system changes its character in the earlier system or systems to which it belongs," and its older relations are reflected in the new system it has entered.

Mead holds that "the emergence of mind is the culmination of the sociality prevalent throughout nature". Mind is the highest expression of emergence; behaviour and sensation pass here into meaning. But, even here, the principle of sociality is not lost. In reaching to the meaning of sensation, the individual has a reference to both systems at once. When meanings are understood in their highest generality, the individual then can command a wide variety of standpoints and is able to isolate that which is common to all.

In the supplementary essays Mead considers the character of the nature of things as it appeared to the research scientist. He insists that material objects—objects of science—are not to be dismissed as sense data or as appearance. He takes the common sense standpoint and does not commit himself to an epistemological theory. He puts the question: "Can we in thought reach that, which is independent of the situation, within which thinking takes place?" He says he approaches from the "standpoint of a science that has undertaken the development of thought from the lowest behaviour," and he concludes like an empirical realist that mind can never transcend the environment on which it operates.

The empirical realism of Mead does

not confine our experience to "the manipulatory idea of contact experience". There are many contexts in which our experience is viewed. The one we accept as standard will determine the direction of activity and its meanings. This power of discovering meaning transforms present experience and justifies the transcendence of immediacy. This transcendence is essentially social for it involves a reference, for meaning, to something existing outside the "time system, within which they are reckoned". This transcendence leads us to the organisation of perspective in which an individual takes *the rôle of the other* to interpret experience not from his ordinary standpoint, but from others. This generalisation and organisation take us beyond the physical object. This is not a new unattainable object but a generalisation of social objectivity.

In this context of meaning and sociality, we pass beyond immediate experience and welcome *space-time* not as "the metaphysical superior of the physical object" (as in the system of Alexander) but "as a natural development of the 'community of interpretation' of which the physical object is a limited experience". We thus achieve social objectivity through organisation of relative perspective. This organisation of perspective is the complete picture of social objectivity of which the theory of relativity is a phase.

Mead begins with the immediate object of experience but rises to the conception of the whole as a social objectivity in which all the terms of experience immediate or implied are integrated.

This does not reduce space and time to a metaphysical reality nor does it identify it with material objects but it implies it as the factor in total experience and social meaning.

The central theme of Mead's philosophy lies in the conception of Sociality as simultaneous existence in two different orders. Prof. Dewey says: "It seems to have something in common with the combination of great originality and unusual difference to others, which marked his own personality".

The doctrine of relativity is a case in point. The author has referred to the increase in mass of a moving body, as an *extreme case of sociality*.

Mead has a fling at the "Parmenidean Solid". But he has lost sight of the present as the constant point of reference which transcends the past and the future. The present can be the locus of reality only as the meeting point of life which is the continuity of the past and the future, but which in itself, as the constant point of reference, is really transcendent.

In fact the present cannot be understood, it always eludes the grasp. The moment it is understood, it is no longer present. The *present* as the locus of reality is beyond time. It is "is-ness". It is absolute.

The idea of Mead's present as *sociality* reduces the absoluteness of the "is-ness" to its relativity or, in Vedantic terms, introduces us into the order of Maya. Mead has no idea of identity apart from the sociality of emergence; we cannot rise above the relativity idea, which to him is very fascinating. But still more fascinating is the conception of a *timeless present*. This present is freedom, and not sociality. It is not solid, it gives a unique freedom from the compelling force of time and change.

Mead has not been able to show satisfactorily how the lower type passes into the higher where the higher is qualitatively different from the lower. In emergence the new order may be related to the old, but how the new emergence becomes qualitatively superior to the old is not sufficiently explained. Complexity cannot plead for the complete newness of the emergent. In fact, the sociality which emerges in this fineness in the higher type is all along present in this functioning throughout existence. But the principle of sociality proves that it is the highest generalised principle working throughout the whole, and as such is older than any of the emergents. It must, therefore, be a universal plan, applied to the concrete facts of life. And, therefore, this



principle must be more universal and speak for its supra-empirical character.

Sociality, therefore, is not a blind principle that is anyhow attaining to self-consciousness in the last stage of evolution; rather its universal application and working show it to be the immanent principle running through the whole.

It only requires the unfolding of consciousness to experience it as such. Emergence, therefore, has a meaning for the scientific realist, whose imagination cannot see the whole. And the newness of the emergence has meaning only for him; this newness is nothing absolutely new. It is new in its appearance in relation to a quite different setting. Though Mead is anxious to avoid *repetitive evolution* in the scientific sense, still his reference to the past and the revaluation of the past in the light of the new emergence, commits him to evolution as a repetitive process. The emergence of the new as qualitatively different makes his position somewhat different from the ancient view of evolution, and in fact every emergence by its influence upon the past is transforming every moment our view of the world in time; and in this sense the world, every moment, has a new orientation. Mead is anxious to make the evolutionary process more complex as it rolls on; but his constant reference to the *past* is significant; he makes the present as the development of the past, though the past *does not contain* it. Here is his essential difference from the Hegelian outlook. Every moment a new world is being evolved. The whole thing has an empirical outlook. The emergent may be new, but the inevitable continuity of the new with the old at once speaks for the transcendence of both of them in the embrace of the whole. They may differ amongst themselves and live in two orders relatively different. The new may be an advance upon the old, but this continuity and inevitable reference to each other supposes a third order in which both are enclosed. This third order is not grouped in the relativity theory. It is

metaphysical. The scientific realist, although he condemns metaphysics, has an unconscious reference to it.

Mead along with Alexander and Whithead seeks to objectify the features of experience, which a dualist philosophy regards as merely subjective, and to show how these notions, purged of their subjective connotation, could take their place in a system of category as a pervasive character of realities, take their start from nature and not from mind. Mead says sociality and psychological process are but an instance of what takes place in nature, if nature is an evolution. From this it can be gathered that Space and Time are to Mead objective realities and not intuition of sense, as they were to Kant. Space and Time in Mead have not the same implication as they have in the system of Alexander. Alexander conceives them as the creative matrix of the whole world detached from the productions or the emergents. Mead's originality lies in showing that every event has a "Space and Time" structure. But they are so essentially related to it, that they can never be separate from it. They form an element in the entire process of sociality. These are elements of the changes which sociality indicates. Space and Time cannot be distinguished from the process of evolution and sociality. They find place in the metaphysical process and change.

Mead combines in him the spirit of realism and empiricism. He has not the boldness to conceive an abstract spatial-temporal world; because he feels keenly like an Empiricist that Space and Time cannot be separated from events and their emergents or, in other words, from sociality. Even here Mead has not been able to envisage any continuity in time or space, for by their very reference to events they have the character of *pictorial space* and *sentimental time*. His idea does not rise above the discrete "Time Sense" associated with events, though he has the sense of sociality in the conception of time. But this sociality does not lead us to suppose a non-empirical reality of Space and Time.

Mead has not been able to get above the discrete "Time Sense" and see the continuity of time, in which past, present, and future are exhibited in a single intuition. The idea of sociality introduces continuity, but since this is always related to events, we do not get to the conception of space and time independent of events.

Hindu Metaphysics show a better conception of Time in the sense of (1) Moments, (2) Cyclic periods, and (3) Eternal duration. Space has also the sense of direction and expanse. The Hindu conceives the possibility of absolute space and absolute time. Time and space in this sense are not related to events. The absolute space and time are metaphysical concepts that have no direct relation to events and which could be known only by intuition. Mead has given us a continuity, but not the endless continuity which gives us the real sense of time.

Moments and cycles are discrete-sense of time cut out of the eternal duration and have a reference to events. They are measured by events; in fact, they

are relative to them. But in eternal duration or absolute space we rise above the sense of relativity. Space indicates the eternal receptivity, Time the eternal continuity. Receptivity and Continuity imply a trio in energy, *i. e.* the eternal possibility which is Sakti, or Maya. In fact, spatial temporal reality is suggested by self-expression of the Absolute through Maya.

Schopenhauer has rightly instituted the objectivity of Space-time in the place of the Kantian Ideality of them. Vedanta has also accepted spatio-temporal order as the objective expression of the creative energy or Maya. Mead does not conceive such a back-ground of the cosmic order. In fact, he criticises Alexander's creative Matrix of the Metaphysical Space and Time. Alexander's approach has a similarity to Vedanta, but he allows Space and Time to appropriate the place of the Absolute; and in this makes the grievous error of displacing the context of existence by the form of appearance.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

### WORDSWORTH'S SOUL-STRUGGLE\*

[J. P. W. brings out the distinctive features of Mr. Fausset's study of Wordsworth, and points out how it presents a truer picture of the poet as well as the man than previously drawn by leading writers.—EDS.]

So many literary critics have given to the world the fruits of a close study of Wordsworth, that another volume might seem almost superfluous, but Mr. Fausset's book breaks new ground and almost displaces the poet from the high pedestal to which he was raised by a long line of critics, such as Matthew Arnold, Lord Morley, Myers and others.

Mr. Fausset gives us for the first time a consistent and convincing solution of a problem which his predecessors in the field of Wordsworthian criticism either failed to give or did not attempt to unravel. Matthew Arnold made a true

statement of fact, but failed to account for the astonishing fact, when he wrote in his well-known essay on the poet:—

Wordsworth composed verses during a space of some sixty years; and it is no exaggeration to say that within one single decade of these years, between 1798 and 1808, almost all his first-rate work was composed.

How is it that Wordsworth's creative genius was practically exhausted from the age of thirty-seven, although he lived to the age of eighty? On this Mr. Fausset writes in his Preface:—

Although many intelligent and interesting explanations have been offered from the time of De Quincey to that of Mr. Herbert Reed,

\* *The Lost Leader: A Study of Wordsworth*, By HUGH I'ANSON FAUSSET (Jonathan Cape, London.)



I cannot help feeling that all of them are partial or fail to go deep enough because the critics have studied Wordsworth's life rather as an intellectual or psychological problem than as a spiritual event.

In this sentence is brought out the very distinctive quality of Mr. Fausset's work. His book deals primarily not with Wordsworth's poetry, but with his inner life. Our author takes the principal events of the poet's life, and examines with philosophic insight the effects of these events on his inner and spiritual nature. Mr. Fausset adds value to his argument by profuse quotation from the poems, and makes us feel that he is not merely expounding a theory of his own, but is giving us a true presentment of Wordsworth the poet and Wordsworth the man, and a very correct diagnosis of his inner life as influenced by his experiences and as reflected in his poetry.

While developing his thesis Mr. Fausset gives expression to profound thoughts on the problems of human life, the laws of spiritual development, and the pitfalls to be guarded against in our search for Reality. His book, therefore, is not only one of literary criticism but is a psychological and philosophical study of the deeper problems of human life, interspersed throughout with observations which strike the reader by reason of their depth and profundity. One such passage we shall permit ourselves to quote:—

The ultimate goal of human life must always be an absolute serenity of spirit. But this vital peace, in however small a measure, is only given to the man who has cast down the last of his personal defences, who out of his deep faith in the creative will of Life and through freedom of attachment to things, has dared to be insecure and in that insecurity has discovered a perfect safety.

The most important feature of Mr. Fausset's book, is of course his successful tackling of the problem which has baffled previous critics, *viz.*, the eclipse of Wordsworth's genius at a comparatively early age. This is traced to his improper relations with Annette Vallon during his short stay in France in 1791-2. In THE ARYAN PATH for October, 1932, Mr. Fausset contributed

an article on this theme, and the Editorial note suggested that the explanation would be accepted by students of the esoteric philosophy if not by western psychologists.

Mr. Fausset traces the early life of Wordsworth as described in "The Prelude," and points out how even in his Cambridge days—

the singleness of being and of vision which he had always enjoyed, 'the quiet stream of self-forgetfulness' upon which he had floated, were no longer serenely his. A rebel self had awoken in him which at times went its own wilful way. His own mental rhythm was no longer in perfect accord with the deep rhythm of life. . . . And to this mental fermentation was added the first faint stirrings of passion and romantic love, themselves a sign of his changed condition. For the desire to complete the self in another which underlies the sex-impulse proclaims a nature which in the necessary process of growth has become to some degree divided and one-sided. (p. 72)

The "long probation" of this divided consciousness, which Wordsworth was never to outgrow, had thus definitely begun. It was with this divided consciousness that at the age of twenty-one Wordsworth went to France and there fell a victim to his passions. Mr. Fausset writes:—

For the first and last time in his life he was completely possessed by love for a woman. The inmost defences of his selfhood went down before the rapture that seized him. He was blindly infatuated as only those who have jealously guarded the shrine of their being can be, when life compels them to fling open the doors. And beneath the overtones of romantic exaltation he felt the throb of sensuous desire. . . . Wordsworth who had prided himself so delusively upon his temperate blood, was powerless against the sudden onset of so intoxicating a desire. It transfigured him into a being for whom discretion was no longer a virtue nor self-security a condition to be prized. Within a few weeks he and Annette were lovers in the fullest sense, and when she left Orleans for Blois in the spring of 1792, she was with child. (p.103,104).

Wordsworth was now a fallen man. During the early part of his stay in France his enthusiasm had been fired by the great ideas which led to the Revolution, and he had decided to throw his lot in with the Brissotins, but all his fiery zeal evaporated after he had given way to his passion for Annette, and he returned to London in January

1793. Not only did he leave poor Annette to her fate, but "he turned his back upon the ideas and forces which for good and evil were to determine human development during the next hundred years" (p. 206). Mr. Fausset points out that Wordsworth by quitting France then escaped the tragic fate of the Brissotins, but his life in more than a physical sense had come under the shadow of death.

It is important to note that, according to our author, the act of sin with regard to Annette did not by itself bring about the eclipse of Wordsworth's creative years. Genuine repentance and honourable amends could have saved Wordsworth, but he, for a number of years after, futilely tried to pacify his guilty conscience by various acts of self-deception and false compromise with his own Spirit.

Wordsworth's "Fall" is dealt with in Part III of the book, but the succeeding Part—"The State of Sin"—is perhaps of greater psychological interest. Here Mr. Fausset points out how Wordsworth resorted to one subterfuge after another to salve his conscience. At the same time he showed the most reprehensible callousness in his treatment of Annette whom he had left in France. Mr. Fausset has given some quotations from her letters, and points out that only a callous nature could have failed to suffer deeply with the writer of such letters. Even if Wordsworth so suffered, outwardly he was acting as any unscrupulous Lothario, but with every month that passed he paid for his self-love with more and more of self-hatred.

Contact with Coleridge and companionship with his sister Dorothy had later a salutary effect on Wordsworth and helped to reestablish his shattered being to a certain extent, but as Mr. Fausset shewed in THE ARYAN PATH, "he never really succeeded in healing the division in himself".

We are now nearing the memorable decade which was to witness all Wordsworth's best known poems. As pure poetry these will always occupy a high place in English literature, but Mr.

Fausset's detailed examination of these poems convincingly shows, we think, that as philosophic interpretations of the deeper problems of life they cannot be accepted without challenge, and that the ideals propounded in them are not in keeping with the ideals and teachings given to the world by the true mystics and philosophers.

Mr. Fausset's criticism of Wordsworth's poetry in Parts V to XI of his book is superb, and it would be hard to imagine its being better done.

It is interesting to compare Mr. Fausset's treatment of Wordsworth with that of Frederick Myers in his famous volume in the "English Men of Letters" series. Mr. Myers tells us there that he had access to many manuscript letters and much oral tradition bearing upon the poet's private life, but that he had shrunk from narrating such minor personal incidents as the poet himself would have thought it needless to dwell on. Mr. Myers writes:—

I have endeavoured, in short, to write as though the subject of the biography were himself its Auditor, listening, indeed, from some region where all of truth is discerned and nothing but truth desired, but checking by his venerable presence any such revelation as public advantage does not call for and private delicacy would condemn.

Possibly Mr. Myers may have had access to the Annette papers. If so, one cannot help feeling, after reading *The Lost Leader*, that his estimate of Wordsworth is sadly incomplete, inaccurate, and one-sided. Of the "Lucy" poems, Mr. Myers wrote:—

And here it was that the memory of some emotion prompted the lines on *Lucy*. Of the history of that emotion he has told us nothing; I forbear, therefore, to inquire concerning it. That it was to the poet's honour I do not doubt, but who ever learned such secrets rightly? Or who should wish to learn? It is best to leave the sanctuary of all hearts inviolate, and to respect the reserve not only of the living but of the dead.

Mr. Fausset has approached his subject differently, and sweeping aside all shams and pretences has attempted to give in his biography not an idealised portrait, but a picture of Wordsworth as he really was.



We shall close our review with a quotation from one of the early pages which gives, in our opinion, the keynote to the whole problem which our author has so skilfully tackled. Wordsworth is there described as—

a potential mystic who failed to complete himself at a crucial point, failed to pass from the state of childhood and boyhood when the spiritual is inevitably a condition of the natural to a creative maturity when the natural should be as inevitably a condition of the spiritual.

J. P. W.

*Æschylus, The Prometheus Bound.* Edited with Introduction, Commentary and Translation, by GEORGE THOMSON, M. A. (Cambridge University Press, London. 12s. 6d.)

Since we must consider the soul rather than the body, however finely apparelled the latter, this review must deal with the ideas of the trilogy of Æschylus, rather than with the literary scholarship of its translator and commentator.

From a careful study of the technique and the "organic symmetry" of construction used by Æschylus, Mr. Thomson has built up a conjectural reconstruction of the theme of the two missing plays of the series. How far he is successful, how far he falls short, may be gauged by comparing his conjectures with the myths of all nations on the same theme. For Prometheus is Lucifer, once bright "Son of the Morning," is Loki chained in Hell; he is the "host" of the Hindu *Manasaputra* who lit the fire of self-conscious mind in the mindless human race by incarnating therein, thus becoming imprisoned by that very act of sacrifice. Prometheus is the human Ego in every one of us, here and now, at once a god in its own right, and a poor prisoner chained to the rock of the material nature, ever torn by the insatiable vulture of desire.

Mr. Thomson gives us, alas, very little in the way of such practical interpretation, but he is right in claiming that Zeus is here represented as cruel and tyrannous; for nature mirrors back to man the evil that springs to activity only with the birth of self-conscious choice; man's heavenly powers, when degraded, become his harsh despot, and the creative power of will, inverted, be-

comes the procreative force of desire.

Mr. Thomson is happy in predicting that in the last play there must be a change in the nature of the two antagonists, and a reconciliation between the two. That is to say, that when spiritual development supersedes the physical and purely intellectual, there will no longer be war between the principles of man's nature, and humanity will find itself Self-redeemed. For Hercules, descendant of dark Epaphus, begot by the touch of the hand of Zeus alone, is one with all the "immaculately-born" saviours, who awaken to their second, *spiritual* birth, through their own Self-efforts and Herculean endeavours; and he is, also, like Zeus, Prometheus, Athena, and the whole Pantheon, an aspect of every man's nature. Æschylus, being initiated in the mysteries, had a scientific basis to his poetry. And while Mr. Thomson produces internal evidence to show that this is the last trilogy written, he does not mention the fact that its author was condemned to death for profaning the mysteries by presenting them in public in these very plays of Prometheus.

There are many interpretations of the myth, supplementing, but not invalidating each other, for it deals not only with individual evolution, but with that of the whole universe, a fact perhaps "glimpsed" by Mr. Thomson. In *The Secret Doctrine*, Mme. Blavatsky writes:

The Promethean myth is a prophecy indeed. . . . It points to the last of the mysteries of cyclic transformations, in the series of which mankind, having passed from the etheral to the solid physical state, from spiritual to physiological procreation, is now carried onward on the opposite arc of the cycle, toward that second phase of its primitive state, when *woman knew no man*, and human

progeny was created, not begotten. That state will return to it and to the world at large, when the latter shall discover and really appreciate the truths which underlie this vast problem of sex. It will be like "the light that never shone on sea or land," and has to come to men through the Theosophical Society. That light will lead on and up to the *true spiritual intuition*. Then . . . "the world will have a race of Buddhas and Christs, for the world will have discovered that individuals have it in their own powers to procreate Buddha-like children—or demons." (II. 415).

If those sincere souls who believe that the betterment of the human race lies in eugenics and birth-control (in reality a pernicious fallacy) will delve

into this moving drama of Prometheus, they will find there clues to the nature of the science of *true* birth-control. But they will be wise, however, to take, in conjunction with this play itself, the chapters in H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* on Prometheus (Book II, Part I, Section XII; Part II, Section XX), which will give a key to him who takes the trouble to turn it. And without the Promethean fire of understanding to light up its inner meaning, the play remains just a beautiful fable, instead of a living presentation of history, past, present and future.

W. E. WHITEMAN

*A Treasure House of the Living Religions.* Edited by ROBERT ERNEST HUME. (Scribner. New York. 12s. 6d.)

This is probably one of the largest anthologies of the world's Scriptures that has ever been published, selections being made from the sacred writings of no less than eleven religions, combined with extensive bibliographical details. Professor Hume's work may be regarded as documentary confirmation of the Theosophical truth that all religions are aspects of the same Teaching, and it is indeed a revelation to read through a single chapter in this anthology and to find the same truths repeated again and again in varying forms. He has divided his selections into chapters under subject-headings, such as Humility, the Perfect Man and Unselfishness, and has given passages containing the essential teachings of the various religions on these subjects.

Professor Hume has, however, made one grave omission—there are no quotations from the scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism, containing the sublime *Prajna-Paramita*, *Avatamsaka* and

*Lankavatara Suttas*—and thereby he fails to give a comprehensive survey of Buddhism. He would have done well, also to include passages from *The Sutra Of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui Neng*, one of the masterpieces of Chinese religious literature and an excellent exposition of the Mahayana. We are at a loss to understand why the author did not quote from these texts. But apart from this failing Professor Hume's work is an admirable guide to the study of comparative religion. It contains a bibliography of the complete scriptures of each of the eleven religions (with the one exception mentioned above) together with their chief English translations; and in the large number of parallel quotations from them the reader will find sufficient proof of the fact that all religions are one in essence, and that the strife between them exists only on account of human blindness. As a Japanese poet has expressed it,

Though many paths there be  
To reach the mountain's height,  
All on climbing see  
The same moon's light.

ALAN W. WATTS



*Issues of Immortality.* By CORLISS LAMONT, (Henry Holt and Co., New York.)

This interesting little book professes to be an introduction to the subject. It is an attempt to analyse the implications of the idea of immortality, but not to investigate either the origin or the truth or the value of the idea.

The writer's inclination is towards an "Aristotelian" view of the relation of soul and body. Body and soul, mind and matter, are distinct but complementary factors. Modern biology and psychology have promoted a strong conviction of the interdependence of body and soul. Some moderners, e.g., McDougall, Bergson, Driesch, advocate a certain "animism" according to which the soul is a psychic structure, not spatial itself, which *acts into space*. But I think the author would not hold such a view to be incompatible with the Pauline idea of a "spiritual" body in the future life: an idea here illustrated by quotations from Anglican writers such as Westcott, Gore, Streeter, Matthews. Some suggest that the new spiritual body is being built up during this life as a kind of sheath within the physical body. Thus we are reminded of Eastern thoughts of an inner integument of the spirit.

The author is clear that the Platonist dualism, which makes soul or mind independent of and even foreign to the body, has lost its appeal to human emotion and human intellect. He is careful to note that we cannot be sure that Plato himself was ever a "Platonist" in this sense of the word.

The Christian belief in immortality, when it came, was based on the "evidence" of the resurrection of Jesus. Shewing the future life of the faithful as a condition of glory instead of gloom, linking it up with the moral values of earthly life and representing it as the immortality not only of the soul but of the whole man, this belief, says Mr. Lamont, "swept the Mediterranean

world and beyond". There were many crude ideas of the resurrection of the "flesh". Even Augustine held that God would collect all the elements of the body which are scattered at death and would reunite them at the resurrection. But the emphasis on a "resurrection of the body" (whether in the Pauline sense or otherwise explained) separated the Christian idea of immortality from the "Platonist" idea.

In recent times, it is pointed out, less attention is paid to "evidences" whether Christian or Spiritualist and more to argument. Most of the modern arguments for immortality go back in principle to Kant. Thus we have the argument from the significance of the Moral Law in conscience, the argument that the cosmos is not likely to have produced a "personality of infinite value" in order to scrap it at death, and the argument (Fichte) from the limitless time required for the perfection of a spirit which is essentially limitless.

The author sets a great value on the "Aristotelian" view of the relation between soul and body. But he sees that it is no easy matter to work out the implications of a "resurrection of the body." For example, the "glorified body" would need a "glorified environment." Perhaps he has hardly stressed enough the supreme implication of immortality, i. e., a living and creative Power, which guides the life of the individual on earth so that it may already share a life eternal in quality; and which provides in the future life a higher kind of body and a higher environment than the earthly, making that life and this a continuous unity even through a process of "miraculous" transformation. All this, of course implies a *faith* which runs beyond all arguments: but, as the author notes, it was Kant's intention not to prove immortality by argument, but by argument to make room for faith.

G. E. N.

*The Spirit of Language in Civilization*, by KARL VOSSLER, translated from the German by Oscar Oeser, (Kegan Paul, London. 12s. 6d.)

In this closely reasoned and intensely terse book of less than 250 pages is presented a most important contribution on the Philosophy of Language, the matured fruits of seven years of the author's scientific study of the languages of the West. Beginning with the origin of Language, the reader is taken through Language and Grammatical forms, Language and Religion, Language and Nature and Life, Language Communities, Language and Science—and Language and Poetry. In every case the author has distinguished the "inner language form" from the "outer". He regards language as a spiritual and creative activity, a natural function of the mind and a medium for thought and exchange of ideas (p. 218).

The book contains many original ideas and observations that are thought-provoking, though some of them are controversial in character. His concept of language differs essentially from that of Croce, for he makes spiritual personality and not individuality the vehicle of language. In the view of the author, "religion depends only indirectly on language, and it can frequently dispense with the mediation of language." In religion what one intends may go far deeper than what is spoken; but one doubts much if "worshippers in a church can even feel themselves the more intimately in touch with their god, if they do not understand the language used in their cult" (p. 25). One also wonders if climate and nature of the soil can have no influence on the speech of man, as the author seems to hold. The author relegates to the realm of pious hope the possibility of realization of a practical common language for the world (p. 167).

"Language Communities" is the longest chapter in the book, and is more readable than the rest. Against the contention of philologists that there is no connection between national character, mental disposition and language, or

that, at any rate, it is scientifically unprovable, the author asserts that a national language is the whole of the nation's mind, and that national feeling, and national character are dependent on and embodied and realized in the national language (p. 115f.). Language cannot serve as a sure test of racial affinities for the historian of civilization when, as the author observes, the Viennese plutocrat can speak Czech with his maid, Hungarian with his coachman, French with his mistress, Italian with his music master, English with his governess and German with his family (p. 121). The author differs from Croce whose philosophy denies the concept of Translation. The purpose of translation is "an economic saving of labour, viz., the trouble of learning a foreign language," and "perfect translations are strategic fortifications, behind which the language genius of a people defends itself against the foreigner by the ruse of taking over as much from him as possible" (p. 182).

The style of the author is generally matter of fact. Some of his statements seem difficult to understand, even with reference to their context; taken out of their places, they become unintelligible, nay mysterious, even to the careful reader; while his coinage of expressions renders more difficult a study that is already trying. On p. 82 is a typically tough sentence; and one like "German or Italian as specific national, individual instrumentations of language thinking are identical with German or Italian language ornamentation" (p. 135) is clumsy and looks un-English. Other instances might be cited. It might be that, for this defect, not so much the author or translator is responsible, as the abstruse nature of the subject and the fact of German being not easily translatable. Let us hope that the translator has realized the purpose intended by the author in his *Philosophy of Translations*. The impression persists, however, that he has not helped sufficiently to clear the obscurity in thought and language which besets the reader almost at every stage. These



are matters of minor magnitude; and the value of this scientific study is enhanced by the modesty of the author,

which finds expression in the last page of the text.

S. V. VISWANATHA

*On the Meaning of Life.* By WILL DURANT (Ray Long and Richard Smith, New York. \$ 1.50)

This is a symposium on the meaning of life elicited and commented on by Will Durant, the well-known author of *The Story of Philosophy* and *The Mansions of Philosophy*. At the instance of the publishers, Dr. Durant addressed a letter of enquiry to a hundred contemporary leaders of thought asking them what meaning life had for them, what kept them going and what help—if any—religion gave them. This book records the answers of more than twenty-five prominent men, among whom are M. K. Gandhi, Sinclair Lewis, E. A. Robinson, André Maurois, Abbé Dimnet and Bertrand Russell.

The book begins with a mordant and incisive statement of the present world-crisis. Dr. Durant assigns the chief rôle in this collapse of man's inner world to the "emancipation" of thought. Truth, he says, has not made man free but has disintegrated his soul and social order.

Then follow the views of his correspondents. Some of them accept the mechanical view of things but insist that the values of life are inherent in life itself. One of them answers with cool defiance that food is what keeps him going and is the source of his inspiration! Mencken and Sinclair Lewis have no need of God and immortality to be happy. Charles Beard, Powys, Robinson, Gandhi and J. H. Holmes display a serene faith in the idealistic view of life. André Maurois, the French man of letters contributes a delightful philosophical phantasy sketching the colonisation of a group of English men and women in the moon and the scepticism of later generations regarding their "mythical" King. A doctor contents himself with asking for advice as to how

human life may be raised above the level of the insects. A lady, Helen Wills of tennis fame, writes delightfully of her "restlessness" for beauty and perfection, but the idea of perfection she has is that of a perpetual ride straight ahead in a fast moving automobile into the infinite. Her letter is a perfect expression of the thrill psychosis described recently in the pages of THE ARYAN PATH.

The book affords rich and varied fare, but one must confess to a feeling of disappointment. Many temperamental reactions are recorded but the real source of the present spiritual *malaise* is not laid bare. Dr. Durant's diagnosis in terms of the suicide of the intellect only confirms the conviction that modern civilisation has not moved from *Manas* or Mind to *Atman* or Spirit. The utilitarian formula of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the Spencerian metaphor of the *Breath of Life*, and recent affirmations of humanism only indicate in Bergson's phrase the addition "of the same to the same," and do not carry us to a new dimension. Oswald Spengler speaks of the motive force of the present civilisation as the search for the Faustian Infinite. As Radhakrishnan puts it, there may be a barbarianism of the mind as well as a barbarianism of the body. Unless a clear and decisive realisation of the positive content of the spiritual life, compact of spaciousness of life (*pranaramam*), joy of life (*mana anandam*), and fullness of peace, (*santi samruddhi*), comes to prevail, I see no way out of the present trouble. Without it, Dr. Beard's hope of providing the good life for all may end only in a democratisation of indulgence and Holmes's creative joy may come to be confused with the satisfaction of instinct. The book is more a cry for light than a source of it.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

*The Lankavatara Sutra. A Text of Mahayana Buddhism.* Translated from the original Sanskrit with an Introduction By DAISSETZ TEITARO SUZUKI. (Routledge, London. 16s.)

Just as the West is deeply indebted to Professor Max Müller and Professor Rhys Davids and his wife and other scholars for its wide knowledge of Pali Buddhism, so its indebtedness grows yearly deeper to Professor Suzuki and his colleagues for the wealth of Mahayana Buddhism with which he is steadily supplying readers of the English tongue. The present volume is the fulfilment of the promise implicit in the author's *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra* published in 1930, and is the fruit of seven years intermittent labour on this famous MS. The Sutra is of profound importance to students of Zen Buddhism, as it was chosen of all others by the famous Bodhidharma for his pupils to study, but its appeal is far wider. Curiously enough its systematic study has been neglected of late years, and it was only Professor Nanjo's translation of the original into Sanskrit in 1923 that once more brought it into prominence. The present English version is based on this Sanskrit translation with occasional reference to the T'ang MS. All that can be said of its age is that it is older than the first known Chinese translation in 443 A. D. and this fits in with its obvious close connection with Ashvagoshā's famous *Awakening of Faith* which would seem to be an attempt to write down in systematic form the contents of the *Lankavatara*.

The importance of the Sutra lies in the fact that it contains almost all the principal teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. The form in which they appear, however, is almost chaotic. As the author says :—

In the *Lankā* all the most fundamental conceptions of the Mahayana are thrown in without any attempt on the part of the compiler or compilers to give them a system. This is left

to the thoughtful reader himself who will pick them up from the medley and string them into a garland of pearls out of his own religious experience.

None the less, Western readers are fortunate in having Dr. Suzuki to guide them in the task of stringing.

The form of the Sutra is a series of dialogues between the Buddha and one Mahamati, a famous Bodhisattva, which took place in Lanka, the modern Ceylon, whither it is alleged the Buddha went, to deliver this Sutra. The text makes difficult reading, particularly the section of *gathas* or verses over which the translator confesses he had the utmost difficulty. Each of the nine principal Mahayana Sutras expounds something not found in the others, and the peculiar province of the *Lanka* is its insistence on self-realisation and the need of rising superior to the limitation of the intellect before true enlightenment can be obtained. It is this factor which makes it of such value to students of Zen. As the author points out :—

A mere intellectual understanding of the truth is not enough in the life of a Buddhist; the truth must be directly grasped, personally experienced, intuitively penetrated into: for only then will it be distilled into life and determine its course. (p. xvii)

Space forbids even the briefest exposition of the contents of the Sutra, but the doctrine of the indwelling Buddha, the inherent perfection which must be slowly and steadily revealed by the elimination of accumulated dross, is pure Theosophy, and students of *The Secret Doctrine*, once they become accustomed to slightly different usage of such words as Alayavijnana and Manas, will find in these terms, and the companion doctrines of Suchness and the Void, an exposition of the Ancient Wisdom which antedated that of H.P.B., but is only another expression of the same undying Truth.

We understand that an Index to the Sutra will be published later as a separate volume.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS



## CORRESPONDENCE

## THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[ A. E. Waite is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS. ]

The American Society for Psychical Research continues to issue amazing accounts of the Margery mediumistic phenomena. There is the testimony, for example, of Dr. Mark W. Richardson, and it falls into two divisions, being (1) that which is concerned with alleged "apports" and "deports" that have not been "susceptible of scientific observation and control"; (2) that which can be "classified and published as actual facts". As regards the first class, the occurrences are described as "bizarre, unpredictable, uncontrollable"—in a word, "beyond belief". They include the appearance of a live pigeon in a dining-room, "though windows and doors were securely closed and locked," the manifestation and disappearance of flowers, jewels, bank-bills of various denominations, and so forth. Of the second there is a single experiment registered, but one which was repeated successfully on a second occasion. As instructed by "Walter," the familiar "control" of Margery, Dr. Richardson—alone in his office—chose, face down, a calendar sheet at random; made on the back of it a print of his right thumb in ink; placed the sheet in an envelope, and the envelope in his pocket-book. He carried it about in this manner for three days, unknown to all, the date-number on the obverse side of the sheet being unknown also to himself. At the end of that time he attended a Margery séance and placed the envelope, as directed, on the table, the room being in absolute darkness. At the close of the sitting the envelope was still in its place, but when examined presently under a bright light it proved to be empty. The calendar sheet was found subsequently on the hall table, where it had been carried from the séance-room on the fourth floor. The date-number had, previous to this, been seen by Margery, as well as the thumb-print, in a state of semi-trance, while an automatic writing medium, taken into another room, had given the number independently and directed inquiry to the hall. Dr. Richardson regards the twofold experiment as "beyond criticism,"\* which notwithstanding, a counter-view may not impossibly emerge. Meanwhile the long-promised Report of the Ame-

rican S.P.R., on the charge that certain "Walter" thumb-prints in wax, obtained at the Margery sittings, "are identical with those of a living man," is still delayed; and one of our most respected contemporaries has affirmed in a leader that "the time has clearly arrived when some definite statement should be made."\* It is high time indeed, when a person so eminent in psychical research as Dr. W. F. Prince has come forward to testify that "in the light of proved facts" the "Walter" claim is "fraudulent". It is past high time when Mr. Harry Price has affirmed in the course of a public lecture that the methods of control used by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research in London are "so rigid that they frightened Dr. L. R. G. Crandon, who cancelled Mrs. Crandon's (Margery's) appointment when he saw them"—meaning an appointment for testing her mediumistic powers.† As a fact, it is now fully twelve months since the American S.P.R. took up the matter of the charges and spoke of a full investigation; but so far its official organ has proffered only "innuendoes and assertions."‡ The Boston S. P. R., which brought the charges forward has not only published rejoinders but has adduced, at their value, some further alleged "plain, cold facts" on the Margery case. It may

be that in a not distant time to come the unbiased Spiritist will be compelled to leave Margery, as Slade and Monck and others were left at an earlier epoch—namely, in that class major of mediums whose phenomena are at times inexplicable—or at least unexplained—but are referable at others to the too familiar arts of trickery.

It happens unfortunately that the year 1933 has opened amidst a storm of accusation in the psychical field. The names involved are numerous, with Margery at the head of the list—attacked, however, at the moment through the channel of her alleged "control". The kinds of mediumship are also varied, from the spirit photography of John Myers and the late William Hope to supposed materialisations connected with the name of Victoria Helen Duncan; and from those of a certain Cyril Budge to the telekinesis marvels of Rudi Schneider, which, on the authority of Mr. Price, were once distinguished as "beyond reproach,"§ but are now questioned by the same witness on the basis of "an automatic photograph" shewing "an arm free behind Rudi, when both his hands were supposed to be controlled by sitters in front".§ As to this, and the conclusions drawn therefrom, it is needful to remember on our

\* *Light*, February 17, 1932, p. 104.

† *The Two Worlds*, February 3, 1933, p. 94.

‡ *Cf. ib.*, March 24, p. 227. "The Research Committee"—of the American S. P. R.—"has spoken, but in each case it has failed to face the issues and has merely questioned the motives of the critics."

§ *Light*, March 10, 1932, p. 149.

§ *Two Worlds*, March 24, 1933, p. 230, deriving from the *Sunday Despatch* of March 5.

\* *The Journal of the American Society*, December, 1932.



part the testimony of Dr. Eugène Osty, the investigations and records of the Paris Metapsychical Institute, the more recent evidence of Prof. D. F. Fraser-Harris, and, perhaps most important of all, the counter-witness of Dr. J. Hutton-Chisholm, who was present at the séance when the accusing photograph produced its fatal picture.\* It is to be noted also that, outside a communication to the secular press, Mr. Price printed his conclusions on the subject in "An Account of some further Experiments with Rudi Schneider," and that it appeared under the auspices of the National Laboratory, as also in the name of its Council, fourteen of whom were present at the experiments. We are informed, however, that none of these was consulted on the Report, that none saw it in MS., and that "the Council as a whole were kept in ignorance for ten months of the photograph". The Acting-President has intervened to register their disagreement with "the implications in the Report."† It will be seen that a pretty quarrel is progressing in respect of the two most famous mediums of the present day, not to speak of some minor personalities who offer their affirmed powers for examination.

Whether it is possible to reach certitude on the physical

side of so-called psychic phenomena seems again thrown open to debate. If this be the outcome of research equipped with a great network of apparatus for the discovery of fraud at séances, what shall be thought of Spiritism in its past history when no such checks were dreamed of, while most were quite impossible in the existing state of scientific equipment? On the other side of the subject—the return of the dead to testify that indeed there is no death—very different problems beset us; and it looks far indeed to the time when they will be taken out of the way. The fixed conviction of Sir Oliver Lodge may rivet our sympathy, and we may wish with all our hearts that something shall emerge ultimately from his proposed test of a sealed letter. He has (1) composed a message which no one else has seen, (2) has committed it to memory, (3) placed it in a sealed envelope in a safe at the office of the S. P. R., (4) where it will remain till his spirit after death announces through a medium that the time has come to open it, (5) by revealing the contents to him or her. The hope is that his personal memory will remain, in which case Sir Oliver concludes that the question of Survival will have been determined affirmatively,‡ and

\* *Light*, March 17, p. 163.

† *Ibid.*, March 31, p. 191. See also *Ib.*, April 7, p. 214, reproducing a letter to Schneider from six Members of the Council.

‡ *Light*, March 3, p. 132, reproducing from the *Daily Express*. Cf. the *Two Worlds*, February 24, p. 145, by which it appears that Sir Oliver again refers to the scheme in his forthcoming book, entitled "My Philosophy".

once for all. But, sympathy and hope notwithstanding, we can imagine the psychics going to work forthwith and attempting to forestall the event. Alternatively, when the day comes, and Sir Oliver carries his green memory to the other side of life; when he communicates—let us assume—his long kept secret message: what of the Research Officers, the Prices, the Dingwalls and so forth of that period? What of its telepathic and other hypotheses? Will there ever be an end, one asks, to the variations of doubt and question, the ever-ringing changes of the spirit which denies, like Mephistopheles? We ourselves have seen wonders in our day and have heard of others by the thousand; we have compared the testimonies; we know the great names and have talked with some who bore them; on our shelves are expositions of the subject at its highest level; but which of us has reached a term? Which of us does not hope that "after all these voices there is peace," perchance somewhere, but not in the Land of Psyche? Let us glance therefore at that which belongs to the Land of Nous, or its threshold, in current thought of the moment.

An essay on the "Revival of Prayer" by the Rev. H. Chalmer Bell may be passed with a word of agreement on several points: the "unknown country"

connoted by the idea of mental prayer, so far as English peoples are concerned; the utter truth of the statement that old Puritanism stifled prayer by preaching; the unquestionable fact that in Christian schools the masters of methodised prayer are Roman Catholic; the inevitable existence of common features characterising all the methods; and so forward to the dissolution of the spoken Word in the Prayer of Silence, with the import thereof in view of the Quaker doctrine that "spiritual progress is achieved in silence". Beyond this, beyond the prayer of quiet, more deeply stilled and deeper yet in-drawn, extends the world of Higher Contemplation. There is also Dr. J. Scott Lidgett's brief study of "Subjectivity and Reality"† which strikes "the electric chain" within us by suggestions and citations concerning that *quelque chose en moi qui soit plus moi*, a "that" within us which is "consubstantial with something" other than ourselves. In virtue hereof perchance it is said otherwise that Man is "organic to the universe";‡ in virtue also of which we are told that it is within the capacity and should become the office of Man to impress coherence and consistency on an apprehended universe. It is in virtue finally of this *plus moi*, or I beyond the I, that personality may be "the culmina-

\* *The Contemporary Review*, February 1933, pp. 211-219.

† *Ibid.*, March, pp. 307-313.

‡ Pringle-Pattison, quoted by Dr. Lidgett.



tion of evolution" as Dr. Lidgett lays down. But such Transcendental Ego is Love beyond all Love, the All without which St. Paul knew that he was nothing, of which Dante says that it "moves the sun and all the other stars". Here is the coherence and here the consistency which the Super-I within us impresses upon the postulated otherness without. It comes about in this manner that our projection of Love upon the universe is the projection of the Inmost Self thereon. But that which "moves" is also that which rules, even if such determinism is other than that of Einstein.\* We seem to trend thus on that

"sphere of Holiness" which Rudolph Otto denominates as "utterly non-rational," because it is supra-rational. It is not less assuredly a mind-state and may belong to that "change of mind" about which Dr. Jacks speaks, saying that it consists not merely "in getting a new one into us, but also, and perhaps more, in getting the old one out of us". The old mind: *voilà l'ennemi*, he tells us. Again it is the mind of Love, is that, which "moves the sun and other stars," an inward mode wherein we are "farthest removed," with Otto, "from all phenomenology" and abide in the sacrosanct of being.

A. E. WAITE

## THE PUZZLE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Apropos of the Editorial intention "to publish some useful articles" designed to solve "the Puzzle of Indian Philosophy" as presented by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in THE ARYAN PATH (Aug. 1932) the present letter undertakes to meet some of the standing difficulties in the way of an intelligent appreciation of Indian philosophy.

Out "to appreciate for the first time the distinguishing characteristics of Hindu thought, and to understand the wideness of the gulf that separates it from European philosophy," Mr. Joad pauses to consider for a moment "the reasons for this separation and for the consequent ignorance of and comparative indifference to Indian Philosophy in the West." As to the etiology of this cultivated ignorance he assigns "two main reasons: the form of Indian philosophy is unfamiliar, the

content unsympathetic". By way of expounding his position he adds further that "the form of most of the Indian systems is broadly the same"—namely "the original poems, the *sutras*, and the commentaries upon and developments of the *sutras*" originating in "philosophical truths intuitively perceived, revelations of reality, which are considered to need neither argument nor defence." Accordingly:—

Puzzled by the form of Indian philosophy, the Westerner is unable to see why it should have been adopted. Is it not, he cannot help wondering, prejudicial to new thought to compel it to accommodate itself within the bounds of a traditional system? Does not the religious veneration with which the systems are regarded as complete compendia of truth tend to stifle free enquiry, and to substitute scholarship and textual criticism, dialectical skill and the ingenuity which is required of those who must fit new pieces into old frameworks, for the free play of the unfettered mind?

This is, indeed, a piece of incisive criticism which, if true, would cut straight into the very vitals of Indian philosophy. "In the second place," as he proceeds to observe, "the doctrines themselves, although of profound metaphysical importance, are uncongenial to the Western temperament," on account of an ingrained "pessimistic attitude to this world" as also one "of fatalistic resignation," for both of which the Westerner with "his temperamental incapacity for renunciation in life" has an instinctive distrust and apathy. Mr. Joad has, however, the philosophical insight to acknowledge that "these are temperamental and not intellectual differences". That is a saving clause serving to minimise the argumentative strain.

In meeting the force of this two-fold criticism, we propose to concentrate on the formal or methodological aspect of the case—referring only incidentally to its material or doctrinal side; for an off-hand remark, or a perfunctory discussion about such problems of foundational importance as the doctrine of *karma* and its relation to the freedom and *summum bonum* of man would make the situation worse instead of clarifying the issues in question. All that we can conveniently note on matters doctrinal is that all the different schools of Indian Philosophy, with the exception of a few heretical ones, unite in enforcing the message of the autonomy of the Spirit—that spiritual freedom which is always born of "self-knowledge" or "self-recognition". To know and to be free—this has been the gospel of all alike; and, as the orthodox schools will add, to know in a corporate as well as individual capacity, to know in the company of seers (*Rishis*) and mystics, handing on the torch of illumination from age to age, and to bring that corporate wisdom to a luminous personal focus. Here at least the Western mind that has through the ages drawn its inspiration from the edifying text of the Gospel of St. John (viii, 32)—"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free"—will

feel itself drawn to its *alter ego* by virtue of an elective affinity.

Undoubtedly, a critic like Mr. Joad is well within his rights to cry "halt" and ask: How does all this tall talk about freedom square with the ingrained authoritarianism of Indian philosophy? Does not the dogmatism, inherent in the inveterate habit of appealing to Revelation (*Shruti*)—which has its necessary counterpart in the strait-jacket method of clothing itself in the age-long *Sutras*—suppress free thinking and thus sound the death-knell of all philosophy?

But, then, it will not do to forget that there are always two sides to a question. Surely we cannot afford to minimise the importance of Authority and Tradition, of *Shruti* and *Smriti* in the economy of our spiritual life. Authority or Tradition as the custodian of dogmas, prescribing the limits beyond which the private judgment of man may not go, is an invaluable asset for humanity. What blurs our vision of this home-truth is the emotional haze created by the magic phrase—"This Freedom!"—the craze of the modernist. "But freedom from what?"—one may pertinently inquire. Not surely an "un-chartered freedom" to drift endlessly—which is, at least humanly speaking, neither possible nor desirable. Indeed, freedom, to be properly construed, must be placed in the context of spiritual values; taken out of that context and used without a qualification, it becomes a doubtful asset, if not a downright liability, in the make-up of the spiritual balance-sheet of humanity. That explains the importance of the qualifying epithet "spiritual" so often prefixed in such contexts to the word "freedom". Without the prefix it is a mere cipher: with it, it has a local value. Hence, here as elsewhere, freedom has to be saddled with safeguards, so that it may be pressed into the service of philosophic thinking. That is why free-lance thought or unbridled reasoning (*niramkusha-tarka*) has never found favour with representative minds of Ancient India; and, as a matter of fact, it has been placed under a ban by

\* *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1933, p. 474, in which Sir Herbert Samuel quotes Sir Arthur Eddington as affirming that "Einstein is still a convinced determinist".



that great master-mind, Shankaracharya. For, in India at least, philosophical thought has never been an intellectual pastime merely, cut off from the moorings of all other values of life. This is the peculiar trait or individuality of Indian philosophy, and has to be accepted as such. Hence, in assessing the worth of Indian philosophy at the thought-exchange of the world, its exponents must see that they do not depreciate its peculiar thought-currency in order to secure an international credit.

Along this line of reflection one is sure to discover, if he has eyes to see, that the much needed adjustment of the respective rights of Authority and Free-thinking, of Revelationism and Rationalism, of Dogmatism and Criticism has been effected, once for all, in the domain of Indian philosophy. Here also Shankaracharya appears in a representative capacity. Appealing, as he does, invariably to the authority of the *Shruti* in matters philosophical, the much too common imputation of unreasoned dogmatism stands refuted in the recognition by Shankara of the importance of what has been aptly called "the internalizing of authority". This is evident from his frequent insistence on *anubhava* or integral experience which personalises the impersonal certitude of *Shruti*. Nothing short of this certitude of personal experience will meet the requirements of the situation. As one noted Catholic philosopher of recent times also testifies:—

The human mind is so constituted that only intrinsic evidence compels assent. No matter how great the authority of the witness, assent is impossible unless the truth in question is luminous to us, is felt as such by us.

Accordingly, entrenched as he was in an inflexible orthodoxy, Shankaracharya had yet the courage of his conviction to assign to full rational insight its proper rank and authority in the matter of attainment of the highest bliss of mankind. So he has given the verdict that "a man who somehow espouses a

creed without previous discussion or critical reflection is dispossessed of beauty and incurs evil"\* This is typically illustrative of the spirit of Hindu orthodoxy which, though depending in the end upon a provisional faith, employs nevertheless a faith that *enquires*. This inquisitive frame of mind is clearly indicated by the systematic emphasis upon *jijnāsa* or critical enquiry as the necessary prelude in the making of Indian philosophy. Thinking always proceeds by questioning experience, and unless there be in evidence this questioning spirit, the search after truth becomes an impossibility.

The steel frame of the *Sutras*, as the critic may justly contend, serves as the natural embodiment of the spirit of Indian philosophy, which is largely under the controlling lead of authority; and the unmistakable affinity in this regard may not unjustly be said to argue a pre-established harmony between the two. Now, the extreme terseness of the *Sutras* which spells their congenital weakness has its historic justification. In the absence of present-day printing facilities, the entire mnemonic (*i.e.* *Sutra*) literature that had to be improvised could not but invoke a rigidly compact form despite the risk of obscurity and ambiguity. The same enforced necessity of abbreviation, that has engendered this anæmic helpless state of the *Sutras*, has itself invented a remedy in the prescript of periodical infusion of new blood from concrete flesh-and-blood existence of commentaries and scholia. Thus embodied and vitalized the *Sutras* prove to be a tower of strength by providing a mariner's compass, as it were, to the individual commentators who might otherwise navigate in an uncharted sea without being ever brought to definite moorings. The *Sutras*, therefore, were designed mainly to arrest the rampant growth of unfettered free-thinking that leads nowhere in the end,—at least, not to the establishment or discovery of truth. The temperamental bias of the Indian

\* Vide his Commentary on the *Vedantasutras* I. 1. i.

mind against chronicling or conserving historical data or individual peculiarities explains this natural predilection for the *Sutra* form. In a wider reference the same tendency expresses itself in the instinctive preference, not for personal, but corporate immortality.

The *Sutras*, accordingly, are conservative—illustrating in a limited manner what we understand by the phrase "conservation of values". "So careful of the type," the *Sutra* seems, "so careless of the single life". Indeed, the *élan vital* of Indian philosophy has from time immemorial carried forward the undying past into the living present which it interpenetrates, and thus, pressing on the frontiers of the unknown, created fresh channels of thought. That seems to be

also the drift of Sir S. Radhakrishnan's suggestive phrase—"the constructive conservatism of Indian thought". Furthermore, it is in reference to the *Sutras* in their constant conjunction with commentaries (*bhāshyas*) that Indian thinkers have achieved the much-needed solution of the standing conflict between the timeless or un-historical and the temporal or historical characters of truths. What the *Sutras* finally emphasize is just this interplay of timelessness as well as historicity of truths, and the guarantee that all our temporal strivings after truth survive in the *Sutra* which is the fittest emblem of the being of Eternal Silence—that is, as the Upanishadic thinker would add, this very Atman.

Calcutta

S. K. DAS

## ROMAN SCRIPT FOR INDIA

The rapid communization of knowledge in the West has been due largely to its possession of an easily manipulated script-system based on the alphabetical letter, in contradistinction to the syllable, as the unit of writing. In India, the unwieldiness of the indigenous scripts has stood against a like result.

The inherence of the vowel "a" in the normal form of the consonant is the root-cause of the complexity of the Indian scripts. Because of this, vowels other than "a," in forming their respective syllables with each consonant, have necessarily had to be provided with a duplicate set of combining signs; instead of being (as they are, in the Roman alphabetical system) merely in juxtaposition with the consonant in their original form.

Thus, in Devanagari—the typical and the most widely used script of India—each of the thirty-four simple and of the scores of the conjunct consonants, as it combines, in order, with the twelve vowels other than "a," has to effect a fresh modification of form. Hence, the number of literary symbols that the beginner has to master before he can

read a book in Devanagari runs up to several hundreds!

The alphabetical character of Roman makes it immune from this "tyranny of the inherent 'a'" and saves it from the clumsy multiplicity of syllabic configurations which are so very necessary in Devanagari. Its simplicity further enables Roman to dispense with the need for independent symbols for diphthongs, which are formed out of their component, primary vowels. Yet again the use of the letter "h" as the aspirating particle, similarly eliminates the need for the ten aspirated consonants ("kh" etc.) of the Devanagari system.

The economy of symbols in Roman is of use to the modern world in two different ways. It minimises effort on the part of the beginner, and smoothes the way for universal literacy—the *sine qua non* of democracy.

Secondly, it adapts the Indian vernaculars to being written on the typewriter. With Devanagari as the script, a typing machine for Hindi must, both in point of construction and of operation, be a rather formidable affair. Commerce and letters, the two departments



of life wherein the typewriter comes in most useful, would benefit considerably from India's adoption of Roman.

Unfortunately, Roman has no equivalents to the whole group of palatals,\* four in number (excluding the related nasal); three of the five nasals;† and two of the four sibilants,‡ of the Devanagari system. Western Orientalists, in their transliteration of Eastern texts, get round this difficulty by the systematic use of diacritical marks over or underneath related letters in the Roman alphabet. But this practice is bound to confuse the non-scholar and, indeed, is wholly inadaptable for common, everyday use. A few new symbols will have to be added on to the existing Roman alphabet.

But firstly India has to rescue the Roman characters from their present confusion, and rearrange them in the phonetic order laid down by Panini.

India, again, can have no use for that Western oddity—the “capitals”. Professor W. T. Brewster of Columbia University frankly admits, in his *Writing of English*, that words “are capitalised merely because we are used to seeing them in capitals”. The

absence of them, so far, in Indian writing has in no way detracted from the beauty or effectiveness of Indian letters.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the hold that English now has upon India will, far from facilitating her adoption of Roman, actually militate against it. For between the loose and inexact way in which the alphabet is now employed in the writing of English and the rigorously phonetic way in which it will have to be employed in the writing of the vernaculars of India, confusion is inevitable. The remedy seems to lie in the systematisation of English spelling.

Apart from its structural superiority to the scripts of India (as, indeed, to those of the entire Orient), Roman has a further indisputable title to become the common literary medium of all-India. It is the script of scientific symbology the world over. It is the script of Europe, of Turkey and of the two Americas. It is not unknown to the *intelligentsia* of the “Far East”. The adoption of it by India will link her, culturally, with the outside world.

V. S. GANAPATI SARMA

*Kumbhakonam*

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

“———ends of verse  
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

In the important discussion on determinism and free will now going on among both scientists and philosophers the aspect emphasized in eastern esoteric philosophy as well as in Hindu thought is overlooked—who or what determines the course of any being or of any process? Design and purpose are in evidence everywhere in Nature; what force or energy works out that design? Teachers of the old world described determinism as the effect produced by the impulse of Will (the ensouling essence of the one and sole principle of abstract, eternal Motion); inherent in this effect or determinism is the fresh cause—the force for a new determinism. “Within fate is the power to overcome fate,” is an occult maxim. With this principle as his guide the reader will be better able to appreciate the extracts given below as well as the reviews of important books—of the scientist Max Planck by Mr. Beresford, of the philosopher Mead by Professor Sircar, appearing elsewhere in this issue.

“Man's Future on the Earth” is the last of a series of papers contributed to the *Personalist* by the well-known philosopher F. C. S. Schiller. His conclusion will

interest all students of mysticism and of idealistic schools of thought:—

We have no abiding habitation on the earth, nor has the earth an assured position in the stellar universe, nor is the physical universe itself eternal and constructed to endure. It . . . is stamped throughout with the marks and signals of impermanence. So I am not disposed to withdraw the judgment I pronounced more than forty years ago when I declared Time to be the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect. The physical universe is, and seems destined to remain, a disappointment. Can we escape from it? Can we emancipate ourselves from the oppressive spell it casts even upon our thought? Can we raise the Veil of Maya? With the aid of Philosophy, perhaps. For to philosophy the point of view of science is not final, and it has the right to insist that all known *data* have to be included in the final synthesis. We should do well, therefore, to remind ourselves how very artificial and selective a creation of our science the physical universe really is. It by no means satisfies the demands of a philosophic synthesis. It by no means uses up all the material provided by our immediate experience. For do we not all live in worlds upon worlds of dream, imagination, and aspiration, which supplement, transmute, and transcend the physical universe? True, we mostly look upon, and down upon, these worlds as “subjective”; but this should not be taken as denying that they are real. It means merely that they are not at present of great pragmatic value, . . .

But this does not entitle us to deny them psychical reality, any more than a dogmatic monism has a right to

No.	Devanagari characters which have no “Roman” equivalents.	How transliterated at present.
* 1.	palatals : ॠ ॡ ॢ ॣ	ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh
† 2.	nasals : ङ ञ ण	ñ ñ ñ
‡ 3.	sibilants : श ष	ś ś and sometimes ç sh



deny them metaphysical reality. Hence a philosophy which reckons seriously with the metaphysical possibility of pluralism and with the psychological ultimacy of personal experience will think twice before it assumes, without further ado, that the present universe of physics is all the being there is, and that the human soul is inextricably entangled in it and cannot conceivably rise above it. But at this point may we not finally remind ourselves that all the major religions have always offered us the assurance that our present world of shows and shadows is not the only nor the true reality, and hinted to us the transcendent glories of their heavens and the terrors of their hells? The argument has led to the threshold of religion, where we must arrest it; but philosophically there is nothing to hinder us from recognizing an indefinite plurality of worlds, with a series of transitions into worlds of higher reality and greater value, which would be heavens, or of nightmare lapses into illusion and unreality, which would be hells. And of both heavens and hells would hold the law, which was enunciated at the outset, and several times repeated, namely that everything will be what it turns out to be in virtue of what it has been through!

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Reminiscent of the true doctrine of Karma are the words of Dr. Schiller in the same article:—

The fact that progress always remains precarious and "contingent" and cannot be formulated as a law, may be found to have some interesting implications. It may mean that we are not *forced* into progress against our will, though we *can* progress *if we will*. In other words, to effect progress our assent is really needed. So, then, we are not the helpless victims of a destiny that drags us to a predestined end; we can actually, to some extent, steer our course and that of history. This is a possibility which should not only enhance our responsibilities, but also encourage us

to play a part that seems no longer negligible. Once we realize that our own action is an essential factor in our future, we can proceed to devise means for grappling with the evils which beset human life. They are many and serious enough, and largely inherent in our nature. But our faith in evolution, meaning thereby the possibility of change, justifies the hope that neither our nature nor that of the universe is irrevocably fixed, and if it is possible to change it at all, it can be changed for the better. It is with this hope in our hearts that we should face the future and survey our present anxieties.

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The death of Sri Devamitta Dhammapala will leave a great blank in the ranks of those who work for the cause of Buddhism. He was the founder of the Maha Bodhi Society. As a young man he came into contact with H. P. Blavatsky, who advised him, as a Buddhist, to work for Buddhism—advice that was taken and faithfully carried out to the day of his death. In a message to all Buddhists, some years ago, he wrote:—

I have spent 40 years in Bengal, Bihar and Benares in the service of our Lord, and with the help of a few friends I have been able to keep up the activities of the Maha Bodhi Society. I owe everything to my parents, to the late Madame Blavatsky and to the late Mrs. Foster of Honolulu.

With a rare singleness of purpose he devoted himself to his cause, and not only was he happy in labouring for its growth in the west as in the east, but also was he fortunate in beholding the fair results of his endeavour.